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ABSTRACT
Pornography deserves special protections, it is often said, because it qualifies as speech; therefore,
no matter what we think of it, we must afford it the protections that we extend to most speech,
but don't extend to other actions. In response, it has been argued that the case is not so simple: one
of the harms of pornography, it is claimed, is that it silences women's speech, thereby preventing
women from deriving from speech the very benefits that warrant the special protections in the first
place.
This dissertation offers a way of making sense of the view that pornography silences women. In
Chapter 1, I develop an account of silencing which, unlike other accounts of the same
phenomenon, helps make clear why a speaker who is silenced is thereby deprived of the benefits
that led us to place a special value on speech. In Chapter 2, I respond to an objection that purports
to show that, even if women are silenced, pornography cannot be responsible: in fact, according to
this objection, the responsibility for any instance of silencing cannot lie with any party other than
the speaker and the audience involved. I show that this objection relies on an overly simplistic
picture of what audiences can reasonably be required to do in a speech situation; I also offer an
alternate picture, which leaves open the possibility that a speaker may be silenced in a context in
which both she and her audience behave competently. In Chapter 3, I consider a view about the
way in which pornography contributes to the silencing - and more generally, to the subordination -
of women. I argue that this view fails because it is too individualistic: it ignores how the social and
political context in which the pornography is consumed helps determine whether it subordinates. I
then make some suggestions about what a more satisfactory view would be.
Though pornography is the principal case study throughout this dissertation, much of what I say
generalizes to other forms of representation that set limits on what speakers are able to convey.
The main aim of my discussion is to contribute to the philosophical and feminist understanding of
communication, by showing how an individual's social role can constrain her possibilities as a
speaker.
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Chapter 1
Silencing Speech
INTRODUCTION
According to a common defense of pornographic speech, pornographers' right to speak is
straightforwardly protected by the First Amendment guarantee of free speech; any attempt to
regulate such speech constitutes a violation of that guarantee.' In a series of recent papers, Jennifer
Hornsby and Rae Langton have argued that the common defense radically underestimates the
complexity of the issue.2 What this defense ignores, according to their reply, is that pornographic
speech silences women, thereby violating their right to speak. This puts pornographers' right to
speak in direct conflict with women's right to speak; consequently, any decision on whether to
regulate pornographic speech must weigh the value of securing for one group the right to speak
against the value of securing the same right for the other group. It may turn out, at the end of the
day, that there is compelling reason to prefer the pornographers' right; but if Hornsby and Langton
are right, this outcome can only be justified by a balancing of interests that is far more complicated
and nuanced than anything the common defense of pornographic speech can recognize.
I shall dub the argument suggested by Hornsby and Langton The Silening Argument to
highlight the fact that it depends on a particular conception of silencing, albeit a rather unusual one.
The argument makes use of the theory of speech acts described by J.L. Austin to spell out this
conception of silencing.3 As we shall see, Hornsby and Langton argue that pornographic speech
contributes to the inability of women to perform a particular category of speech acts, namely, those
I will use the term pornographer to refer both to those who produce pornography and to those who distribute it.
2 Rae Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993): 293-330; Jennifer Hornsby,
"Illocution and Its Significance," in Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, edited by
Savas L. Tsohatzidis (New York: Routledge, 1994): 187-207; Jennifer Hornsby, "Disempowered Speech," Philosophical
Topics 23 (1995): 127-147; Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton, "Free Speech and Illocution," Legal Theory 4 (1998): 21-
37; Rae Langton and Caroline West, "Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game," Australasian Journal of Philosophy
77 (1999): 303-319.
3 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed., edited by J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1975).
that Austin labels illocutionagy acts. Because they cannot perform these illocutionary acts, women are
unable to do with their words what other speakers are able to do with theirs; this counts as
silencing just as much as preventing them from uttering words altogether. Moreover, Hornsby and
Langton also argue for a conception of the right to free speech according to which silencing in this
sense - i.e., illocutionary disablement - constitutes a violation of that right.' They then conclude
that pornographic speech violates women's right to speak by contributing to their illocutionary
disablement.
I shall argue that this reliance on Austin's account of illocutionary acts brings with it several
problems. One problem is the concept of illocution itself: certain well-known difficulties with that
concept become particularly pressing in the context of defending the Silencing Argument. There
are other problems as well. Perhaps most importantly, no plausible conception of the right to free
speech can suppose that it includes a right to perform any illocutionary act whatsoever; this point
has been made by Daniel Jacobson.S This gives rise to a second problem that the defender of the
Silencing Argument has to face, namely, that of distinguishing those illocutionary acts that can
plausibly be supposed to be protected by a right to free speech.
These and related problems have led critics to conclude that the Silencing Argument is
indefensible; I shall argue that this conclusion is much too hasty. Closer examination of the central
examples of silencing suggests that the illocutionary acts whose disablement constitutes silencing do
share a special feature: they are purely communicative, in a sense not shared by all illocutionary acts. It
is this feature of certain illocutionary acts that makes their disablement count as silencing, and that
makes that silencing a contravention of the speaker's ability to make herself heard. What we need,
then, to clarify the conception of silencing at issue is an account of what it is for an act to be purely
4 See especially Homsby and Langton, "Free Speech and Illocution," for this argument.
s Daniel Jacobson, "Freedom of Speech Acts? A Response to Langton," Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1995): 64-79.
communicative in this sense, not an account of what it is for the act to be illocutionary in the
Austinian sense. The theory of speaker's meaning due to H.P. Grice provides just such an account.'
It is not my intention to undertake in this chapter a wholesale defense of the Silencing
Argument. My goal here is more modest. I want to explain and motivate a re-framing of the
argument; I take this re-framing to be a necessary first step in any such defense. The conception of
silencing at which I arrive is somewhat different from the one Hornsby and Langton had in mind.
But I think that my conception is preferable, for at least two reasons. First, it helps explain why
the instances of silencing they mention are ones in which it is women's right to speak that is at issue,
as opposed to their right to perform actions of some other kind. Given that we tend to regard
speech as in some ways more valuable - and therefore, more worthy of special protections - than
other actions, this is a point of great import. Moreover, my conception makes clear that the
silencing can happen in several different ways, and that, accordingly, pornographic speech can
contribute to the silencing in several different ways. Examining the ways in which the silencing can
take place will allow us to get some sense of the empirical commitments of the argument.
It is worth noting that, even if we ultimately reject the conception of the tight to free
speech preferred by Hornsby and Langton - and in particular, even if we reject that conception as a
possible interpretation of the right guaranteed by the First Amendment - the Silencing Argument
would still be of interest. Part of what this argument attempts to establish is that women's abilities
to speak and be heard are impaired by pornographic speech; if this is right, then the Silencing
Argument succeeds in pointing out a significant wrong being suffered by women. Whether this
wrong is best regarded as an infringement of their right to speak is, to some extent, a further
question. There are, it seems to me, many ways of redressing such wrongs: imposing legal sanctions
on pornographers is one - but by no means the only - way. For a number of reasons, we may
ultimately decide that the wrong is best redressed in some other way. Be that as it may, getting
clear on the relevant notion of silencing has to be the first step towards understanding and
6 H. Paul Grice, "Meaning," in his Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989): 213-
223.
eventually remedying the wrongs suffered by women qua speakers; this is precisely what this chapter
tries to do. The main conclusions of this chapter do not require accession to any particular
interpretation of the right to free speech; rather, my aim here is to clarify why it is speech - and in
particular, women's abilities to speak - that is at issue in the Silencing Argument.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next two sections, I present the Silencing
Argument in more detail. In Section I, I sketch the theory of speech acts on which the argument
relies; along the way, I note a difficulty for the Austinian framework that, derivatively, makes
trouble for the Silencing Argument. In Section II, I briefly explain the conception of the right to
free speech preferred by Hornsby and Langton; in this context, I also consider a second difficulty
for the Silencing Argument, namely, the one raised by Daniel Jacobson. In Section III, I turn to
Hornsby's response to the first of the difficulties mentioned above: I argue that her account doesn't
work as a response to that problem, but does provide an answer to the problem raised by Jacobson.
I also argue that this last conclusion provides some reason to think that the Austinian framework
isn't the best choice for framing the Silencing Argument. In light of this, I go on to show, in
Section IV, that the Silencing Argument can be re-framed using the Gricean framework of speaker's
meaning. Finally, in Section V, I conclude by noting several advantages of adopting the Gricean
framework with respect to clarifying the notion of silencing with which we are concerned.
I. THE SILENCING THESIS
The Silencing Argument proceeds in two steps. The initial step is to explain and defend what I
shall call The Silencing Thesis.
Pornographic speech silences women.
As will become clear in what follows, there may be more than one interpretation of silencing which
makes the Silencing Thesis true. However, for the purposes of the Silencing Argument, there is a
further constraint on acceptable interpretations of silencing: we need a sense of silencing which, in
addition to being a truth-maker for the Silencing Thesis, also allows us to proceed with the second
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step of the argument. This second step consists in the defense of another claim, henceforth to be
referred to as The Free Speech Thesis.
The silencing of women by pornographic speech constitutes an infringement of their
right to freedom of speech.
What is needed for the Silencing Argument to work, then, is a sense of silencing according to which
what is silenced is speech of the sort that is protected by - an acceptable interpretation of - the
right to free speech.
A. The Austinian Framework
It is easy to see why Austin's theory of speech acts is attractive in this context. The central insight
of this theory is that speech is action: words are used to do things, to perform acts.' Among the
things that words may be used to do, of course, is to say things with certain meanings; but Austin
believed that philosophers tend to focus on saying at the expense of all the other acts that words
can be used to perform, such as warning, marrying, promising, etc. And if this is right - if speech is
action, if speaking is doing various things with one's words - then it seems reasonable to suppose
that silence can be failing to do some of the things that one wants to do with one's words.
Austin distinguishes three sorts of acts that a speaker might perform with her words.
Suppose that, as Ben is about to leave the house without a coat, Ann says, "It's cold outside."
First, Ann has here uttered words which express a particular content: this is her locutionay act. The
content expressed by any utterance is fixed by the conventional meanings of the words in the
sentence uttered, plus the context of the utterance. Thus, in my example, the content expressed is
that it is cold outside the building in which Ann and Ben are located at the time of the utterance.
Next, in saying these words, Ann may succeed in warning Ben that it is cold outside: this is her
illocutionary act.8 Illocutionary acts are ones which a speaker can perform, in the right sorts of
SFollowing Hornsby, I will use acts to denote types of things that people do, and actions for particular doings. Thus the
distinction between acts and actions is a type-token distinction. In performing any one action, a speaker may have
performed any number of distinct acts. Homsby, "Illocution and Its Significance," pp. 187-188.
8 Warning is, of course, not the most well-known of illocutionary acts; that distinction no doubt belongs to the
illocutionary acts that are generally, or at least, often performed by means of conventionalized formulas, such as
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contexts, just in virtue of uttering certain words: in those contexts, her utterance simply constitutes
the act in question.9 Finally, by saying these words, Ann may cause Ben to do certain things: for
instance, she may persuade him to put on a coat before he ventures out. This is her perlocutionary act.
Following Hornsby, we might say that illocutionary acts aim at "essentially linguistic"
effects, whereas perlocutionary acts aim at extra-linguistic ones.'0 For Ann's utterance to succeed
as a warning, the only response required from her audience is that he recognize it as a warning: that
is, to use the Austinian term, the utterance has to secure uptake. Because that is all the response
that is required from the audience, illocutionary acts may be considered aspects of linguistic
communication. By contrast, the success of perlocutionary acts requires more from the audience
than mere comprehension of the speaker's intention: for Ann's utterance to persuade Ben, he must
- in addition to recognizing the utterance as a warning - also accept that it is, in some sense, unwise
to go outside without a coat. In other words, he must also come to believe the warning, which is
entirely unnecessary for the success of the illocutionary act."
Illocutionary acts generally have felicity conditions, i.e., conditions that must obtain in
order for these acts to be performed successfully. For many illocutionary acts, the attendant felicity
conditions are determined by social conventions: thus, to count as having performed the
illocutionary act of marrying in saying "I do," the speaker must be unmarried, standing before the
appropriate authority, with an unmarried person of the other sex, in the presence of the appropriate
witnesses, etc. But not all illocutionary acts have felicity conditions that are determined in this
promising, marrying, christening, etc. Nevertheless, I introduce the notion of illocution using warning because
illocutionary acts like warning, which are rarely, if ever, performed by using conventionalized formulas, are more
pertinent to the Silencing Argument than the others. We shall see why this is so in Section III.
9 Other examples of illocutionary acts include promising, marrying and christenng-as mentioned above-as well as
urging, telling, suggesting, and refusing. Thus, in saying "I will be there by 7 o'clock," I make a promise: my utterance
constitutes the illocutionary act. Similarly for the other illocutionary acts.
10 As a matter of fact, this way of drawing the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts doesn't quite
work, for reasons that will be discussed in Section III. Nevertheless, it is worth thinking about this proposal, for-as
we shall see in Section III--it is no mere mistake on Homsby's part that she draws the distinction in this way.
"l Hornsby, "Illocution and Its Significance," pp. 189-195.
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manner. The illocutionary act of warning, for example, requires only that there be certain beliefs,
shared between the speaker and her audience, about which actions are advisable. Thus, for Ann's
utterance to succeed as a warning, she and Ben must both believe that going out in the cold
without a coat is inadvisable, or at least, that it is generally believed to be so. But unlike the
marriage act - the felicity conditions of which are explicitly formulated in the marriage laws - there
is no formal system of rules that sets the felicity conditions for the act of warning.
As we shall see shortly, the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is
crucial to the Silencing Argument as conceived by Hornsby and Langton; unfortunately, it is also
notoriously difficult to clarify. Austin hypothesized that the differences between by and in
locutions might provide one way of marking this distinction: illocutionary acts are those that we
perform in uttering words, whereas perlocutionary acts are those we perform by uttering them.
However, it seems clear that our intuitions about the differences between these locutions are not
robust enough to do the necessary work. It will also not do to say - following another suggestion
of Austin's - that illocutionary acts are distinguished by having felicity conditions that are
conventionally determined; nor to say that illocutionary acts are the ones which require uptake for
their successful performance. As suggested above, it is not clear in what sense illocutionary acts like
warning can be said to have conventionally determined felicity conditions. Moreover, certain
perlocutionary acts, such as persuasion, also require uptake.
We are, therefore, still in need of a criterion that will help make this distinction precise.
There is one proposal that we have yet to fully explore, namely, Hornsby's proposal that
illocutionary acts are "essentially linguistic," whereas perlocutionary acts aim at extra-linguistic
effects. I shall return to the proposal shortly; for the moment, having at least sketched the
Austinian framework, I want to continue with the account of the Silencing Argument.
B. Kinds of Silence
Corresponding to the threefold distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary
acts, Langton distinguishes three ways in which someone can be silenced: simple silence,
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illocutionary disablement, and perlocutionary frustration. Where no words are uttered, there is
simple silence. Where there is speech, but the illocutionary act intended by the speaker is not
performed, perhaps because one of the relevant felicity conditions is not satisfied, there is
illocutionary disablement. And finally, where there is speech, but the perlocutionary effect
intended by the speaker is not realized, there is perlocutionary frustration.
The difference between perlocutionary frustration and illocutionary disablement is nicely
illustrated by the following example of Langton's, which can be used to show how a woman might
suffer from either sort of silencing in a context in which she is unable to refuse sex.
Example 1 (Refusal): A woman says "No" to a man, intending to refuse sex. The man
hears her, and recognizes the locutionary act that she intends to perform; that is, he
understands the conventional meaning of the word 'No', and recognizes that the
woman is uttering a word with that meaning. Nevertheless, the woman's utterance
does not do what she wants it to do; the man goes on to force sex on her.
Let us begin with perlocutionary frustration. The man might understand that the woman does not
want to have sex with him, that she intends to refuse sex by saying "No," and just not be deterred
from doing as he wishes by his recognition of her refusal. Or else he might have eroticized the
refusal itself, so that his recognition of her intention to refuse actually spurs him on to rape her. In
such cases, she seems to perform the illocutionary act of refusal, for she intends to refuse, and her
audience recognizes this intention; therefore, there is uptake. However, her utterance doesn't have
the consequences that she wants it to have: in particular, it fails to deter him from raping her. As a
result, her perlocutionary act is frustrated.
The woman's utterance fails in a very different way if the man does not even recognize her
intention to refuse sex. He might think that she doesn't really mean what she says, that she is being
coy, that she is "playing hard to get." Moreover, he might understand her in this way because this is
a sexual context, and he believes that this is how women behave in sexual contexts. If this is the
explanation for his failure to stop, then there seems to be no uptake on his part of the woman's
intention to refuse. Further, this is so partly because of his attitudes towards women in general: for
huim, women in sexual contexts do not satisfy the felicity conditions for the illocutionary act of
refusal, for he thinks that they always desire sex in such contexts, but don't want to appear too
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forward. Since there is no uptake, the woman's utterance doesn't constitute the act she intends it
to be, namely, a refusal; her illocutionary act is thus disabled.
We have thus distinguished two senses in which the woman in Example 1 might be said to
be silenced, even though she is able to utter words. But nothing has been said so far about what
pornography might have to do with either sort of silencing. In the case of perlocutionary
frustration, it is easy enough to see how pornography might be involved, though perhaps not so easy
to show that pornography is in fact involved in that way. If, for instance, pornography teaches its
consumers to eroticize refusal and sexual violence, then there is a straightforward causal connection
between pornographic speech and perlocutionary frustration; that connection, however, has proven
very difficult to establish empirically.
What about the connection between pornographic speech and illocutionary disablement? A
similar causal story can be told. Pornographic speech produces in its consumers beliefs that prevent
them from understanding that women might want to refuse their sexual overtures. Among the
relevant beliefs might be those mentioned above, that is, that women are coy, that they don't mean
what they say, and so on. On this view, then, pornography plays a causal role in the illocutionary
disablement of women: it causes this illocutionary disablement, by producing beliefs that prevent
women from securing uptake. The Silencing Argument is here committed to an empirical claim; a
complete defense of the argument will therefore have to include an empirical investigation.1 2
II. THE FREE SPEECH THESIS
We have now distinguished a couple of different interpretations of the Silencing Thesis. Depending
on whether the silencing in question is perlocutionary frustration or illocutionary disablement, we
have The Perlocutionay Silencing Thesis:
12 On the question of the connection between pornographic speech and illocutionary disablement, Homsby and Langton
in fact part company. The causal story described above is due to Homsby; I present it rather than Langton's because it
is the simpler of the two. The difference between the two stories is not relevant for the purposes of this chapter,
though it is perhaps worth mentioning that Langton's story also commits the Silencing Argument to an empirical claim
at this juncture, albeit a different one than Hornsby's.
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Pornographic speech contributes to the perlocutionary frustration of women's
speech acts.
or The Illocutionagy Silencing Thesis:
Pornographic speech contributes to the illocutionary disablement of women's
speech acts.
But let us now recall that, for the purposes of the Silencing Argument, we need a sense of silencing
which makes the Free Speech Thesis true. That thesis makes the following claim:
The silencing of women by pornographic speech constitutes an infringement of their
right to freedom of speech.
Thus, the question becomes: does either perlocutionary frustration or illocutionary disablement
constitute an infringement of the right to free speech?
Of course, the best interpretation of the right to free speech is a matter of some debate; but
at the very least, it seems clear that it should not be construed as the right to freedom from
perlocutionary frustration. The right to free speech is supposed to ensure that one's ideas are not
denied a hearing simply because they are unpopular; it is not supposed to ensure that those ideas be
persuasive. If a right to perlocutionary success were guaranteed by the right to free speech, every
speaker would have - among other things - the right to persuade her audience to believe whatever
she wanted, do whatever she wanted; but that is surely not a right we would want to secure for
speakers, even if we could. Therefore, if silencing is understood as perlocutionary frustration, the
Free Speech Thesis is just false.
What about illocutionary disablement? Here the matter is more complicated, for while
perlocutionary success involves the achievement of extra-linguistic effects, illocutionary success - at
least in some cases - is nothing more than being understood by one's audience. Hornsby and
Langton argue that if members of a particular group are systematically misunderstood, then their
ideas do not get a hearing; then, even if permitted to utter words, they are deprived of the capacity
that the right to free speech is supposed to protect. So if women are systematically unable to refuse
sexual overtures because their intended audiences fail to understand their efforts to do so, it is small
comfort to note that they are not prevented from uttering words; they are prevented from doing
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one of the things that makes uttering words important in the first place. Given that we value free
speech because it allows voices that are unattractive to the majority - or to the powerful - to be
heard, shouldn't we want to make sure that women are able to get a hearing for what they want to
say? Shouldn't that be part of what is protected by the right to free speech? And if it is, then it
follows that the illocutionary disablement of women as in Example 1 constitutes an infringement
of their right to freedom of speech, as required by the Free Speech Thesis.
Obviously, we are moving rather quickly over some very complex issues regarding free
speech, which deserve more attention than I am able to devote to them here. But in light of what
has been said, one point seems particularly in need of clarification: if the issue under consideration
is whether the right to free speech includes a right to freedom of illocution, something has to be
said about how comprehensive the latter right is supposed to be. Can we suppose that speakers
should have the right to perform any illocutionary act whatsoever? Some who are unconvinced by
the Silencing Argument have answered this question in the negative, and, moreover, have taken
that answer to constitute sufficient reason to reject the argument altogether. In the remainder of
this section, I will consider one such response to the Silencing Argument, due to Daniel Jacobson.
Jacobson's critique of the Silencing Argument is founded on the thought that Langton's use
of the concept of illocutionary disablement has certain "misleading features." Of these, the most
worrisome - for Jacobson - is that all of Langton's examples are such that any "right-thinking
person" would find the instances of illocutionary disablement deplorable, and would want the
situations remedied by securing illocutionary enablement for the speakers. '3 Thus, for instance, it is
clear that women should be able to refuse sex; further, it is also clear that black South Africans
should always have been permitted to vote, and homosexual couples to marry.'4 But this sequence
13 Jacobson, "Freedom of Speech Acts?" p. 75.
14 These are further examples mentioned by Langton of illocutionary acts of one group of speakers being disabled by the
speech acts of another group. The pronouncements of legislators in South Africa under apartheid made it the case that
the felicity conditions for the act of voting could not be satisfied by black South Africans. Certain speech acts
performed by these legislators-perhaps the yes votes that enacted into law the proposition that only persons of certain
races would be allowed to vote-constituted the felicity conditions of the act of voting, so that that act could not be
performed by blacks. Similarly, the pronouncements of legislators in the U.S. have made it the case that the felicity
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of examples obscures the fact there are just as many cases in which it does not seem morally
problematic to deny certain speakers the right to perform certain illocutionary acts. Arguably, no
wrong is done to convicted felons by preventing them from voting, nor to twelve-year-olds and
would-be bigamists by precluding them from marrying.
From this, Jacobson concludes that there can be no comprehensive right to freedom of
illocution: that is, there is nothing amiss, morally speaking, in denying certain speakers the right to
perform certain illocutionary acts. So, he writes, "there is no tension in defending a woman's right
to refuse sex and denying a child the right to marry.""• Further, the explanation for this lack of
tension, according to Jacobson, is that freedom of illocution is not freedom of expression, and it is
only the latter that is protected by the right to free speech. In other words, even granting that
certain speakers should be enabled to perform certain illocutions, this is not because such
illocutions are protected by the right to free speech. Therefore, on Jacobson's view, the Free
Speech Thesis must be rejected.
Jacobson's first point seems right: there simply can't be a comprehensive right to freedom of
illocution, for the very reasons he offers. What is odd about Jacobson's rhetoric is the implication
that Langton could be supposed to have suggested that there is such a comprehensive right. In fact,
contra Jacobson, it is not clear that all of Langton's examples of illocutionary disablement are such as
to demand remedy in the form of illocutionary enablement for the speakers. In particular, consider
the following example. Langton notes that Muslim women, unlike Muslim men, cannot secure
divorce by saying "Talaq, talaq, talaq": the felicity conditions of the divorce act are such as to
require that the speaker be male.' 6 However, it is not at all obvious that the best remedy in this
case is to seek illocutionary enablement for Muslim women. Perhaps the better response would be
to also illocutionarily disable Muslim men. Anyway, the point is open for debate.
conditions of the marriage act cannot be satisfied by homosexual couples. See Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable
Acts," p. 317.
15 Jacobson, "Freedom of Speech Acts?" p. 76.
16 Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," p. 317.
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Still, there is perhaps a more charitable way to interpret Jacobson: we might take him to be
posing a challenge to a defender of the Silencing Argument. According to this interpretation, the
upshot of Jacobson's first conclusion is that a defender of the argument must provide a criterion for
distinguishing those illocutions she takes to be protected by the right to free speech from those that
are not. To put the point a little differently, we need to know what it is about certain illocutions
that marks them as the ones protected by a commitment to the value of free speech. If we agree
that the silencing of women by pornographic speech is an infringement of their right to speak, but
that the silencing of twelve-year-olds and would-be bigamists by the marriage laws not an
analogous infringement of their right, we need an account of what makes the difference. Without
such an account, we are in the dark about the scope of the Silencing Argument.
Unfortunately, Jacobson's further claim - to the effect that there is no comprehensive right
to freedom of illocution because freedom of illocution is not freedom of expression - makes the
charitable interpretation improbable. Given that there is no comprehensive right to free illocution,
Jacobson seems to think that it follows that the First Amendment guarantee of free speech cannot
extend to illocutionary acts at all. He thus simply ignores the possibility that the guarantee of free
speech protects just some, but not all, illocutions, and that there might be a principled way of
distinguishing the privileged ones. Therefore, if he does intend to issue a challenge to the defender
of the Silencing Argument, as supposed by the charitable interpretation, he then proceeds to dismiss
out of hand the possibility that the challenge can be met. But such a dismissal is not warranted;
further argument is required to make this move, and Jacobson fails to fill in the gap.
Let us, then, put aside Jacobson's second claim, and take up instead the challenge posed to
the defender of the Silencing Argument by the charitable interpretation of his first. Can the
defender meet this challenge? We shall see in the next section that she can.
III. ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS
We have now two outstanding questions regarding the role of illocutionary acts in the Silencing
Argument. The first, which came up in Section I, concerns illocutionary acts as a class:
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(1) What distinguishes illocutionary acts from perlocutionary ones?
As we saw in Section II, it is essential to the argument that (1) be answered, for the silencing at
issue in the Silencing Thesis must be understood in the illocutionary - rather than the
perlocutionary - sense in order for the Free Speech Thesis to be plausible. The second question is
Jacobson's challenge, also mentioned in the previous section:
(2) What distinguishes the illocutionary acts which are protected by the right to
free speech?
This pair of questions will be the focus of this section. I will begin by looking at an answer to
question (1) offered by Hornsby's account of illocutionary acts. I will argue that, though that
account doesn't succeed in providing an answer to (1) - contrary to what Hornsby herself supposes
- it does yield a possible answer to question (2). Further, I will also suggest that the reason the
account fails as an answer to (1) offers some insight into why an answer to that question has
proven so elusive.
The chief claim of Hornsby's account is that illocutionary acts may be characterized, as a
class, by their role in communication. I shall dub this claim The Illocution Thesis.
The illocutionary features of an action are the ones that constitute it as a
communicative action."
Hornsby's defense of this thesis has two parts: first, she offers an account of what distinguishes
illocutionary acts; then, she goes on to suggest that the feature that distinguishes illocutionary acts is
precisely the feature that constitutes any action that possesses it as a communicative action. I shall
present Hornsby's account in some detail, for it contains some valuable insights into the nature of
the silencing in Example 1; though I will go on to reject parts of this account, these insights are
7 Hornsby formulates the claim in several ways. At different points, she writes that her aim is "provide an account of
an idea of illocution which reveals the use of words to be communicative action"; that "some features of speech actions
flow from something in the nature of linguistic communication itself, and those features, which are illocutionary ones,
constitute the actions as of certain specifically communicative acts"; and also, that illocution is "the crux of all those
actions which are communicative uses of language" ("Illocution and Its Significance," pp. 187-195). My version of the
Illocution Thesis is intended to capture what is common to these formulations.
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nevertheless important, for they will ultimately help motivate a re-framing of the entire Silencing
Argument.'"
A. The Illocution Thesis
Consider again Ann's saying to Ben, "It's cold outside," just as he is about to leave the house
without a coat. In doing so, she expresses the thought that it is cold outside. At the same time, her
utterance may have certain other effects as well: for instance, it may serve to warn Ben that it is
cold outside, to persuade him that it is cold outside, and further, to persuade him to put on a coat
before venturing out. Achievement of each of these effects requires a different response on Ben's
part. For instance, for Ann to succeed in warning Ben, it is sufficient that he recognize her
intention to warn him; by contrast, if she also wants to persuade him that it is cold outside, his
recognizing that she intends to do so will not suffice to bring about the desired effect. In the latter
case, something further is necessary, such as his believing that she is in a position to know the
temperature outside, and that she is not a chronic liar.
As suggested by this example, both illocutionary and perlocutionary acts aim at certain
characteristic effects, the achievement of these being the success conditions for such acts: thus, the
illocutionary act of warning aims to warn, and the perlocutionary act of persuading aims to
persuade. And from the difference - described above - between what is required to achieve the
characteristic effect of each act, Homsby draws the following idea about how to distinguish
illocutionary acts: only for these acts is the audience's recognition of the speaker's intention to
perform the act sufficient to achieve the effect at which it characteristically aims. In other words,
18 It is worth noting here that the Illocution Thesis is very congenial to the Silencing Argument, for it lends support to
the second step of the argument, namely, the defense of the Free Speech Thesis. As mentioned in Section II, the right
to free speech is supposed to ensure that unpopular ideas get a hearing; that is, it is supposed to ensure that no one is
prevented from communicating something simply because it is contrary to the interests, beliefs, or values of the
majority, or of the powerful. But that suggests that the right to free speech is intended, in a sense, to protect the
possibility of communication. Then, if the performance of illocutionary acts is constitutively linked to the use of words
to communicate, as claimed by the Illocution Thesis, it also seems reasonable to suppose that the freedom to perform
illocutionary acts is an aspect of the freedom of speech. But that is precisely what is required by the Free Speech
Thesis.
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according to Hornsby, to successfully perform an illocutionary act, it suffices to secure uptake for
one's intention to do so. There is nothing more to successfully performing acts such as warning. By
contrast, though uptake may be necessary for the successful performance of many perlocutionary
acts as well, it is never sufficient.
Securing uptake is thus essential to the successful performance of illocutionary acts; but
how is that uptake ever secured? That is, what enables an audience to recognize what a speaker
means to do - illocutionarily - with her words? Hornsby replies that uptake can be achieved when
there is what she calls reciprocity between the participants in a conversation. Reciprocity consists in
a "certain receptiveness" or "attunement" on the part of the audience towards the speaker's
attempted performances. This "attunement" enables the audience to be sensitive to what the
speaker is trying to do."' On Hornsby's view, reciprocity is both necessary and sufficient for
securing uptake. This leads her to a second characterization of illocutionary acts: they are the ones
which characteristically aim at effects that can be secured solely through reciprocity.
It is crucial to Hornsby's account that reciprocity is an aspect of "normal linguistic
exchange," that it is nothing extraordinary. Reciprocity is simply the basis for successful
communication: a speaker succeeds in communicating with her audience to the extent that
reciprocity obtains between them. Homsby stresses that there is more to communication than the
production by a speaker of sounds with certain contents, and the interpretation by the audience of
those sounds as expressing those contents. In addition, communication also involves the
publication of the speaker's intention to, for instance, tell her audience something, or ask him
something, or warn him of something; moreover, communication is successful only when the
audience recognizes these intentions. The existence of reciprocity makes this recognition possible.
We are now in a position to understand why Hornsby accepts the Illocution Thesis. Given
her account of illocution - as characteristically aiming at certain effects, which are achieved by the
audience's recognition of the speaker's intention to achieve those very effects - and her picture of
1" Hornsby, "Illocution and Its Significance," pp. 192-193.
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linguistic communication - as characteristically involving the publication and recognition of the
speaker's intentions - it is easy to see why she takes the illocutionary features of an action to be
intimately connected with its communicative features. For her, then, the Illocution Thesis amounts
to the following claim: in order for a speaker to succeed in communicating with her audience, her
intended illocutionary acts must secure uptake.20 Since, further, illocutionary acts secure uptake only
when reciprocity obtains, it also follows that successful communication requires reciprocity.
B. An Objection to the Illocution Thesis
A remarkable feature of Hornsby's account is that it hardly ever mentions the illocutionary acts
with which Jacobson was primarily concerned, such as marrying, and voting, and further, knighting,
exonerating, canonizing, and so on. Recall that Jacobson was moved to reject a comprehensive
right to free illocution because, he argued, there can't be any problem with denying convicted
felons the right to vote, and twelve-year-olds the right to marry. Illocutionary acts such as warning,
telling, asking, and stating are importantly different from the ones on which Jacobson focuses for
the simple reason that the latter depend upon social institutions in a way that the former don't. As
mentioned in Section I, there are conventionalized procedures to be followed in marrying, such that
there is no marriage if these procedures are flouted; by contrast, there are clearly no analogous
conventionalized procedures governing the use "It's cold outside" to warn.21
In concentrating on the conventionalized illocutions at the expense of the ones Hornsby
favors, Jacobson follows Austin himself. Hornsby diagnoses this tendency of Austin's as the reason
for the latter's mistaken - she argues - supposition that it is a matter of convention that a speaker
20 Note that it is not Homsby's intention to argue that successful communication does not require uptake of the
speaker's intended locutionary acts as well. In general, a speaker's illocutionary acts achieve uptake only when her
locutionary acts do: thus, Ann's utterance of "It's cold outside" would not succeed as a warning if Ben failed to
recognize the content expressed by her utterance. Rather, Homsby's point is that successful communication requires
more than just the success of the locutionary acts.
21 Of course, all utterances may be said to be governed by linguistic conventions, which determine, for instance, what
the words uttered mean. But this is not the type of convention at issue here: the marriage act is also governed by social
conventions, which determine who can marry, and what one must do to marry. The point here is that it isn't clear that
there are analogous social conventions governing the act of warning.
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who performs a locutionary act at the same time performs some particular illocutionary act. On her
view, "[Austin's] initial preoccupation with what is actually a very special class of illocutionary
acts" led him to overemphasize the role of convention in illocution.2 2
Is the difference of focus between Hornsby and Austin significant? To see that it is,
consider again the illocutionary act of marriage: like warning, it also aims at a characteristic effect,
namely, that the speaker be married. Unlike warning, however, that effect cannot be achieved
simply by securing uptake: the audience's recognition of the speaker's intention to get married,
though necessary for successful performance of the marriage act, is not sufficient. If the speaker is,
for instance, known to be twelve years old, or already married, her utterance of "I do" will not
count as marrying. Thus, though it is true that the marriage act requires uptake, that is not the only
effect that must be achieved in order for this act to succeed.
On Hornsby's account, the basis of the difference between perlocutionary and illocutionary
acts is that the latter aim at certain effects which can be achieved purely by the audience's coming
to recognize the speaker's intentions, through reciprocity; perlocutionary acts also aim at
characteristic effects, of course, but more is required for their achievement. However, once we
notice that acts of marriage, voting, and the like also belong in the realm of the illocutionary, we
have to abandon Hornsby's proposal for distinguishing between the illocutionary and the
perlocutionary.
Yet another attempt to rescue the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction thus proves
inadequate; that may seem rather discouraging for the prospects of the Silencing Argument. But
perhaps things are not as bad as they seem. The illocutionary acts in the examples on which the
Silencing Argument turns are clearly more similar to warning than to marriage: the woman in
Example 1 is illocutionarily disabled because her audience fails to recognize her intention to refuse,
not because she flouts any conventionalized procedures governing the act of refusal. Were he - her
22 Hornsby, "Illocution and Its Significance," p. 192.
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audience - to recognize her intention, that would suffice for the success of her illocutionary act.
Nothing further is required for the success of an act of refusal.
But this suggests that the feature that Homsby mistakenly takes to characterize illocutionary
acts as a class does in fact characterize the sub-class of illocutionary acts that are of interest to the
Silencing Argument, in the following way: only disablement of illocutionary acts having this feature
counts as silencing in the sense that is of particular concern for a defender of the Silencing
Argument, that is, in the sense that constitutes an infringement of the right to free speech.
Therefore, for the purposes of the Silencing Argument, it would be sufficient to show that the right
to free speech protects just the illocutionary acts that belong to that sub-class. The sub-class in
question, of course, is the one consisting of illocutionary acts that are successfully performed if the
audience recognizes the speaker's intention to perform them, that is, if uptake is achieved. And this
constitutes progress because this gives us a possible answer to Jacobson's challenge, that is, the
problem of distinguishing the illocutionary acts that are protected by the right to free speech.
To recapitulate, we began this section with a pair of questions about the role of
illocutionary acts in the Silencing Argument: how they are to be distinguished from perlocutionary
acts, and how the ones that are protected by the right to free speech are to be distinguished from
the rest. We considered Hornsby's proposed answer to the first question: she suggests that
illocutionary acts are the ones that can be successfully performed by achieving uptake.
Unfortunately, this suggestion doesn't work, for it excludes from the realm of the illocutionary the
very acts that Austin took to be paradigmatic of that realm, such as marriage. However, it does
open up a way of responding to the second question, once we notice that the illocutionary acts in
the examples central to the Silencing Argument do fit Hornsby's description: we thus have a way of
isolating the sub-class of illocutionary acts that are pertinent to that argument, and consequently, a
possible answer to the second question.
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C. Purely Communicative Acts
Recall now the second part of Hornsby's defense of the Illocution Thesis. Hornsby contended that
(successful) communication consists in the speaker's publication of her intention to do certain
things with her words, and the audience's recognition of those intentions. Accordingly, we may call
acts which have the following feature purely communicative actr. they are successfully performed if the
audience recognizes the speaker's intention to perform them. Though Hornsby errs in supposing
that all illocutionary acts are purely communicative, this is no reason to reject either her conception
of successful communication - which seems right - or her insight that many, perhaps even most,
illocutionary acts are purely communicative. Warning, for one, belongs in that category, as does
refusal. One way of putting my proposed answer to Jacobson's challenge is to say that the
illocutionary acts that are protected by the right to free speech - and therefore, the ones that are of
particular interest to the Silencing Argument - are precisely the purely communicative ones.
Marriage, by contrast, is not a purely communicative act; nor are voting, knighting,
exonerating, or canonizing. Unlike the purely communicative acts, an act of marriage does not
primarily aim to communicate something; rather, the primary aim of a marriage act is just that that
the speaker be married, and this cannot be achieved through communication alone. This points to a
deep heterogeneity in the class of illocutionary acts, between those acts that are purely
communicative and those that are not. That heterogeneity, in turn, casts doubt on the extent to
which the acts that Austin identified as illocutionary have anything in common, and therefore,
partly explains why a distinguishing criterion for the class has proven so elusive.
By framing the Silencing Argument in Austinian terms, Hornsby and Langton run the risk of
obscuring the sense of silencing that is really at issue there: it is not illocutionary disablement that
should be the focus, but rather, to coin a phrase, communicative disablement, or inability to perform
purely communicative acts. Failure to grasp this point has led critics such as Jacobson to complain
that the defender of the Silencing Argument is committed to a comprehensive freedom of
illocution. To avoid such confusion, the Silencing Argument should rely on a theory of
communication, which, contra Hornsby, Austin's theory of illocution is not. Furthermore, the
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argument should also avoid using the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, in
light of the continuing futility of efforts to clarify that distinction. As I shall argue in the remainder
of this chapter, all of this can be accomplished by abandoning the Austinian framework, and re-
framing the Silencing Argument in terms of the theory of communication suggested by Paul Grice.
IV. SPEAKER'S MEANING
In his 1957 article "Meaning," H.P. Grice proposed an account of what it is for a speaker to mean
something on a particular occasion by producing an utterance. For Grice, this was the first step in a
much larger project of elucidating the various notions of linguistic meaning, including word
meaning, expression meaning, and sentence meaning. The guiding idea behind this project was that
all such notions can be reduced to the basic notion of speaker's occasion-meaning. This last notion,
in turn, was intended to capture those uses of the word 'mean' that are "specially connected with
communication" 23: that is, what a speaker means on a particular occasion is supposed to be closely
related to what she is trying to communicate on that occasion. In what follows, I shall have
nothing to say about the larger project; rather, I shall focus here only on Grice's account of what it
is for a speaker to attempt to communicate, with the ultimate aim of using this account to
understand what goes wrong in Example 1.
A. The Gricean Framework
Suppose that I want to convey to Mr. X that Mr. Y has been displaying "undue familiarity" towards
Mrs. X.24 I might try to do this by pursuing any of several strategies, including either of the
following:
Strategy 1: I present Mr. X with a photograph of Mr. Y and Mrs. X in a
compromising situation.
23 H. Paul Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," in his Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989): 88.
24 This is one of Grice's own examples, slightly elaborated. See Grice, "Meaning," p. 218.
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Strategy 2: I sketch a picture of Mr. Y in such a position, and show that to Mr.
X.
Consider Strategy 1 first: in giving Mr. X the photograph, I attempt to convey information about
Mr. Y's behavior by providing "direct evidence" of that behavior. If, upon viewing the
photograph, Mr. X perceives what is happening in it, I will have succeeded in my endeavor. I will
have fulfilled what we might call my informative intention, namely, my intention to inform Mr. X that
Mr. Y has been unduly familiar with his wife.
Of course, it isn't in general convenient - or, in most instances, even possible - for a
speaker to satisfy her informative intention by supplying direct evidence of what she wants to
convey. Direct evidence about events in the past, for example, is usually difficult to procure;
therefore, if providing such evidence constituted out only means of relating thoughts about the
past, we would be severely constrained with respect to what we could convey. But, in fact, direct
evidence is not often necessary. Grice's central insight is that, in order to inform an audience of
something, it generally suffices for the speaker to provide evidence, not of what she intends to
convey, but of her intention to convey this; that is, it generally suffices for the speaker to provide
evidence of her informative intention. This is precisely what I try to do when I draw a sketch for
Mr. X: my drawing is intended to serve as evidence of my intention to inform him of something,
namely, Mr. Y's behavior. If Mr. X interprets my utterance - my drawing of the sketch - correctly,
he will come to recognize my intention to inform him about Mr. Y's behavior; if, moreover, he
considers me a sincere and trustworthy source in such matters, he will also come to believe that Mr.
Y has been behaving in a familiar manner with Mrs. X, thus satisfying my informative intention.
Clearly, then, I might satisfy my informative intention by pursuing either of the strategies
mentioned above. Nevertheless, the two strategies differ crucially in that it is only the second that
requires for its success - viz. the satisfaction of my informative intention - that Mr. X recognize
that I have that intention. In order for that second strategy to work as intended, Mr. X must
recognize my utterance as an attempt on my part to inform him of something. If he fails to
recognize this - if he supposes instead that I am just doodling, for instance - my utterance may very
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well not have the effect I want it to have. Moreover, if, instead of drawing the sketch in his
presence, I had left it for him to find in an apparently accidental way, he would be more likely to
take it for idle doodling, being unaware of any informative intention; as a result, he would be less
likely to infer from it the inappropriateness of Mr. Y's behavior. By contrast, had I arranged for
him to find the photograph in the same apparently accidental manner, he would be more likely to
perceive the inappropriateness of Mr. Y's behavior, even without recognition of any informative
intention. Therefore, the publication of my informative intention is essential only to the success of
Strategy 2, not to that of Strategy 1.
According to Grice, it is this difference that makes my drawing the sketch - but not my
producing the photograph - an instance of a speaker meaning something by her utterance. It is a
necessary condition for communication taking place, on the Gricean view, that the speaker have
not only an informative intention, but two further intentions as well: first, what we may label her
communicative intention, which is her intention to get her audience to recognize that she has a certain
informative intention; and second, her intention to satisfy her informative intention by virtue of
satisfying her communicative intention. This analysis is summarized in the following set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for a speaker's meaning something by her utterance25:
An utterer U meant something by uttering x iff, for some audience A, U uttered x
intending:
(a) A to produce a response r,
(b) A to think (recognize) that U intends (a); and,
(c) A to fulfill (a) on the basis of his fulfillment of (b).
Intention (a) is what I have called the speaker's informative intention, while intention (b) is her
communicative intention. What a speaker means, on any particular occasion, is given by the content of
the response she intends to produce in her audience. Thus, for instance, when I draw Mr. X a
25 It is worth noting that Grice uses 'utterance' in "an artificially wide sense, to cover any case of doing x or producing
x by the performance of which [an utterer] U meant that so-and-so. The performance in question need not be a
linguistic or even a conventionalized performance" ("LUtterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," in his
Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989): 118).
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picture, I mean that Mr. Y has been unduly familiar with Mrs. X.26 The third clause of the analysis
requires that the fulfillment of (b) give the audience a reason to fulfill (a), though typically, it is not
by itself sufficient reason. Something further is generally necessary for the audience to satisfy (a): in
the example we have been considering, Mr. X satisfied my informative intention - by producing the
relevant belief about Mr. Y's behavior - on the basis of his satisfaction of my communicative
intention, along with his confidence in my reliability and trustworthiness.
B. What Goes Wrong in Example 1
With Grice's account before us, we can now return to Example 1. In that example, a woman
attempted to refuse a man's sexual overtures, but her attempt failed to have the desired effect,
namely, to make him stop. Among the several possible explanations for this failure, the one that
was of particular interest to the proponent of the Silencing Argument held that the woman's
utterance failed to make the man stop because it didn't - and couldn't - achieve uptake: certain
attitudes held by her audience rendered him unable to recognize her attempt to refuse as such.
Consequently, there was a breakdown of reciprocity, and the woman was thereby illocutionarily
disabled.
Since this example makes crucial use of the act of refusal, we need to pay more attention to
what sort of act this is supposed to be. Acts are characterized, at least partly, by the effects at
which they aim, and by the conditions required for their successful performance. With this in
mind, we need to ask: at what sort of effect does the act of refusal aim? What conditions must
obtain for a successful performance of this act?
Suppose Ben offers Ann a cup of coffee, and she wishes to refuse it. At least part of what
she wants to do, in refusing, is to let Ben know that she does not want that coffee. That suggests
that the following is a characteristic effect at which acts of refusal aim: in refusing, the speaker
attempts to produce in her audience a belief about her own desires, a belief to the effect that she
26 This is not to suggest, however, that all utterances aim to produce beliefs, or even that all utterances aim at responses
that are specifiable using a that-clause.
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does not desire what is being offered. Unfortunately, that isn't quite right, since it isn't always the
case that a person doesn't want what she refuses. For instance, Ann may refuse the coffee because
she thinks that coffee is bad for her heart, even though she very much wants the jolt of caffeine to
wake herself up. It seems unattractive to say that, in refusing, Ann misrepresents herself as lacking
desires that she in fact has. But this difficulty is easily fixed if we consider the example a little
further: given that Ann refuses, it would seem that her desire for the coffee is outweighed by her
desire to do what is good for her heart. So, when a person refuses something, she doesn't want it,
all things considered, and it is this all-things-considered desire that she attempts to communicate via
her refusal.27
If it is right that acts of refusal have this communicative component, then we should be
able to give a Gricean account of what a speaker means by producing an utterance that is intended
to constitute a refusal. Looking once again at Example 1, it seems right to say that when the
woman in the example says "No," she means - among other things - that she does not want to have
sex with the man to whom she is speaking. Then, according to the Gricean analysis, the woman
must have the following triad of intentions: she must intend that,
(a) her audience be informed - or equivalently, come to believe - that she does not
want to have sex with him;
(b) her audience come to recognize that she has the informative intention
mentioned in (a); and finally,
(c) her audience satisfy her informative intention on the basis of his satisfaction of
the communicative intention mentioned in (b).
If all goes well, he will recognize her informative intention, thereby satisfying her communicative
intention (b); this recognition, when paired with certain attitudes towards the speaker - such as a
27 An account of refusal that understands the act as an attempt to convey a desire seems to me preferable to an
account that understands it as an attempt to convey an intention. Suppose that I am being mugged, and the mugger
demands that I hand over my wallet. It may be clear to me that there is nothing I can do to prevent the wallet from
being taken from me, since the mugger is much bigger than I; as a result, I can't intend not to hand over my wallet to
him. But it seems that I can still refuse to hand over my wallet, which suggests that refusals seek to convey something
weaker than intention.
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belief to the effect that she is being sincere - will suffice for him to infer that she does not want to
have sex with him. If all of this takes place, they will succeed in communicating on this occasion.
But of course, all does not go well in the example we are considering. The man does not
come to believe that the woman does not want to have sex with him; so, her intention (a) is not
satisfied. It is at this point that the Gricean framework becomes particularly useful, for it allows us
to distinguish several different reasons an audience might fail to produce the response the speaker
wants him to produce. Distinguishing these possibilities helps throw light on what is required for
successful communication, as well as on what is required to remedy failures. With this in mind, let
us canvass some of the possibilities with respect to Example 1.
C. Possibility 1: The speaker's communicative intention is not satisfied
The first possibility I shall consider is that the woman in Example 1 says "No," but her audience
fails to recognize her informative intention, i.e., her intention to inform him that she does not want
to have sex with him; in so doing, he fails to satisfy her communicative intention. There are at least
two ways in which this possibility might be realized:
Possibility 1A: He (the audience) fails to recognize that she has an informative
intention at all.
Possibility IB: He recognizes that she has some informative intention or other, but
mistakes the content of her informative intention, i.e., mistakes the
nature of the response she wants him to produce.
To complicate matters further, 1A and 1B can each be realized in more than one way. However, in
the interest of intelligibility, I will ignore most of these sub-possibilities, focusing instead only on
1A, and moreover, only on one way of realizing 1A.
To understand how the man in Example 1 could fail to see that the woman has any
informative intention whatsoever, we need to remember the sort of context in which they are
situated. It is a sexual context: that is, it is a context in which the man has made sexual overtures
towards the woman. The woman is thus an object of sexual desire for the man. On certain views
of sexual desire, to be an object of someone's sexual desire is just to be regarded by that person as
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an object, suited - by virtue of its "nature" - for use by him for his sexual gratification.2 8 Roughly,
something is regarded - and treated - as an object if it is taken to have only instrumental value, that
is, taken to have value only insofar as it can be used for the achievement of desirable ends: in
particular, objects of sexual desire are taken to derive their value from their suitability for use in
achieving sexual gratification.
Unlike persons, objects may be put to use without being consulted about their needs and
desires. In fact, for many objects, it is a category mistake to think of them as having needs and
desires. Consider, for instance, the absurdity of trying to ascertain the needs and desires of a table,
before using it as a writing desk. Other objects - or entities that, for certain purposes, may be
regarded as objects - may be said to have needs and desires, but these can nevertheless be ignored
when they are to be used for the purposes for which they are suited by their objecthood. On some
views, animals are objects in this sense.
If to regard a woman as an object of sexual desire is to regard her as an object in either of
these senses - that is, either as not having needs and desires, or as having needs and desires that can
be discounted in sexual contexts - then the man who thus desires her will not seek her consent to
intercourse. In fact, he may not even recognize that her consent is necessary, since it is a
consequence of something's being regarded as an object that its needs and desires, if any, are taken
to be discountable. Therefore, though he hears her utter words, he may not regard her as a speaker,
in the sense of having anything to say that is relevant to the situation. And if he doesn't count her
as a speaker, he will certainly fail to recognize any informative intention she may have.
It is worth noting that this account of how Possibility 1A might come to be realized - that
is, of how the man in Example 1 could fail to realize that the woman has an informative intention,
despite her saying "No" - does not assume that all sexual desire is objectifying in the manner
described above; all that is needed is the premise that some sexual desire fits that description. This
28 For an interpretation of MacKinnon according to which she holds such a view of sexual desire, see Sally Haslanger,
"On Being Objective and Being Objectified," in A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, edited by
Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993): 85-125.
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is, of course, in part an empirical claim, and so beyond the scope of the present project; but it seems
to me at least plausible.
D. Possibility 2: The speaker's third intention is not satisfied
A different possible explanation for the failure in Example 1 is this: the woman says "No," but the
audience does not satisfy her informative intention on the basis of his recognition of her
communicative intention. Again, there are a couple of ways that this might happen:
Possibility 2A: He fails to satisfy her communicative intention.
Possibility 2B: His recognition of her communicative intention does not constitute
for him a reason to satisfy her informative intention.
2A is, of course, just Possibility 1 again: we have already discussed, albeit briefly, one way in which
that possibility might be realized. Let us therefore turn to 2B: what sort of conditions must obtain
in order for that possibility to be realized? As before, in the interest of intelligibility, I will
concentrate on just one of the possible answers to this question.
In the previous section I considered the kind of sexual desire that regards and treats any
object of that desire as an object having only instrumental value; I argued that a consequence of
such desire is that its objects are regarded as not having needs and desires of their own, or else, as
having needs and desires that may be ignored. To be distinguished from this - but just as
problematic in its own way - is the kind of sexual desire that projects onto its object the needs and
desires the subject wants her to have.2 9 As such, the object of the desire is understood to have
needs and desires, and these needs and desires are even taken to be relevant to the context in
question: that is, it is not supposed that she is suited by her "nature" for use for purposes of sexual
gratification, regardless of whether she wishes to be so used. The mistake here is of a different
kind: the woman is regarded as having desires that she doesn't in fact have. In particular, she is
taken to have the desire to engage min sexual intercourse with the man who so desires her.
29 For a conception of sexual desire along these lines, see Langton, "Love and Solipsism," in Love Analyzed, edited by
Roger E. Lamb (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997): 123-152.
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How can such a mistake be made? That is, how can someone not pathologically disturbed
suppose that a woman who clearly says "No" in fact harbors a desire to have sex with him? Once
again, showing that such mistakes do take place is, in part, an empirical matter; the most that I can
do here is to suggest a possible explanation.
It is a platitude that, in many of our social interactions, we bring to the table beliefs,
expectations, etc. about how those interactions are likely to proceed: these include suppositions
about what the other concerned persons are likely to say, how they are likely to behave, and so on.
On some occasions, these attitudes will be founded on what we know about the persons with
whom we happen to be interacting; on other occasions, especially - but not only - where that
personal information is not available, the attitudes will instead be founded on the social and
cultural roles we take the others to occupy. For instance, in restaurants, we expect the waiters to
act in certain ways and not others: we expect them to be helpful, to some extent deferential, not
loud or disruptive, etc. These expectations, I suggest, are all founded on the cultural role of Waiter,
with which we are all familiar, and which we expect particular waiters to satisfy.
In a similar vein, we might suppose that the man in Example 1 has certain expectations
about how an interaction between a man and a woman is likely to proceed, and that these are
partly based on what he takes the cultural roles of Man and Woman to be. This is not in itself
problematic; a problem arises only if he has certain conceptions of these cultural roles. In
particular, if he supposes that women are likely, in sexual contexts, to be coy, to not want to
appear too forward, to pretend to not want sex, then he will take a woman who says "No" in such
a context to be insincere. He may very well understand the meaning of the word, and even
recognize that its utterance would be indicative, in many circumstances, of the speaker's intention
to refuse what he is offering. But because he thinks that she actually does want sex, he takes her
"No" to be something other than an expression of her desire not to have sex with him: perhaps he
takes it instead as an invitation for him to "convince" her, that is, as an opening gambit in a bit of
role-playing in which she pretends to be reluctant. As a result, his satisfaction of her communicative
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intention doesn't constitute for him a reason to satisfy her informative intention. In short,
Possibility 2B is realized.
V. ADVANTAGES OF ADOPTING A GRICEAN FRAMEWORK
In motivating their reliance on Austin's work in framing the Silencing Argument, both Hornsby and
Langton emphasize his attention to the acts that are performed in and by producing linguistic
utterances, as opposed to the contents - the meanings - that are thereby expressed. Langton
reminds us that Austin warned of a "constant tendency in philosophy" to focus on the latter at the
expense of the former"; further, both Hornsby and Langton argue that this tendency has to be
overcome in order to understand the Silencing Thesis. On their view, it is only when we appreciate
that we do many different things with words - besides expressing contents - that we can begin to
see that there are forms of silencing that don't require that anyone be prevented from uttering
sounds, or inscribing marks: in order to silence someone, it is enough to prevent them from doing
some of the (non-locutionary) acts they seek to perform with their words. If this is right, then the
tendency of which Austin complained obscures the possibility of these other forms of silencing.
I have argued in this chapter for two related claims: first, that we needn't rely on the
Austinian framework to make out the sense of silencing with which Hornsby and Langton are
concerned; and second, that using the Austiman framework is in fact more of a hindrance than a
help in this project, for it gives rise to difficulties that are avoidable on a different way of
understanding silencing. The first claim follows from the discussion in the previous section, where
it was argued that the Gricean framework of speaker's meaning can be used to explain how the
speaker in Example 1 is silenced. The sense of silencing in which Hornsby and Langton are
particularly interested is illocutionary disablement, as illustrated by the inability of the woman in
Example 1 to perform the act of refusal. Using the Gricean framework, we can see that this
illocutionary disablement can happen in any of several ways, two of which were discussed in some
3 Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," p. 295.
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detail in the previous section. Both are ways of silencing of the sort that Hornsby and Langton
have in mind: in both, the man's forcing sex on the woman can, in part, be explained by his failure
to understand her, rather than by his recognizing but choosing to ignore her refusal.
Given that we needn't be tied to the Austinian framework, the second claim - that that
framework is more of a hindrance than a help - follows from the discussion in Section III. I argued
in that section that the sense of silencing in which Hornsby and Langton are interested - and which
they take to be a violation of the right to free speech - is not illocutionary disablement simpliciter,
but rather, disablement of a particular sub-class of illocutionary acts. I dubbed the members of the
sub-class the purely communicative acts, because the primary aim of any such act is to communicate
something to an audience. All//the acts that are instances of a speaker's meaning something by her
words - in accordance with the Gricean analysis - are purely communicative in this sense. But this
means that we no longer have to identify the acts that are of particular interest to the Silencing
Argument as a sub-class of illocutionary acts: the Gricean analysis gives us an alternate way of
identifying them. As a result, we also no longer need either a criterion for distinguishing
illocutionary acts as a class, or one for distinguishing the particular sub-class in question. The need
for either criterion is eliminated once we leave the Austinian framework, which is part of why that
framework is really a hindrance with respect to understanding the Silencing Argument.
Two further points in favor of adopting the Gricean framework: first, because the Gricean
framework makes it particularly easy to distinguish different ways that a speaker and an audience
can miscommunicate, it actually helps us get a better grip on the senses in which the woman in
Example 1 may be silenced. Langton, for one, concentrates on silencing in contexts in which
"consent is the only thing a woman can do with her words"31: a context in which the audience
projects onto the speaker desires that she doesn't in fact have is an instance of this. But, as we saw,
the silencing can happen in other ways as well, such as if the woman is not regarded as a speaker at
all: in that case, she is not thought to be either consenting or refusing, for, in light of her assigned
31 Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," p. 324.
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status as object, her consent/refusal is taken to be irrelevant to the situation. Distinguishing the
ways in which the silencing can take place helps make clear the empirical commitments of the
argument, for it brings to light different ways in which pornographic speech can contribute to the
silencing.
Second, adopting the Gricean framework allows us to avoid what Jacobson dubs "a strange
and troubling consequence" of the Silencing Argument.3 2 The consequence he has in mind is that,
because she is illocutionarily disabled, the woman in Example 1 in fact fails to refuse the man's
sexual overtures; this follows from Austin's view of illocutionary acts, according to which a speaker
does not succeed in performing an illocutionary act unless she secures uptake. On this view, the
speaker in Example 1 attempts to refuse, but doesn't manage to do so. But where there is no
refusal, worries Jacobson, there can be no rape. This difficulty doesn't arise on the Gricean view.
On that view, the speaker, in saying "No," means that she doesn't want to have sex with the man
just in case she has the three intentions mentioned in the analysis. Since a person can have
intentions without having them be recognized by others, a speaker can mean something without
having that meaning be understood by her audience. Further, because the speaker in Example 1
does mean that she doesn't want to have sex with the man, his forcing sex on her constitutes rape.33
Austin was surely right to complain of the tendency among philosophers to ignore the
variety of acts that can be done with words. But it is worth noting that this insight doesn't sit well
with the aspirations of the Silencing Argument. After all, the upshot of the argument is supposed
to be that silencing in the sense in question contravenes women's right to free speech. But if the
silencing is constituted by women's inability to perform certain actions, then it is unclear why the
conflict should be with the speech right, rather than any other. That is, it is certainly true that
32 Jacobson, "Freedom of Speech Acts?" p. 77.
33 There are other ways of resisting this point ofJacobson's. Hornsby and Langton point out, in response to the same
point, that absence of refusal isn't the same as consent, and where there is no refusal, there may still be rape. So they
aren't committed to the admittedly bizarre view that the woman in Example 1 isn't raped because she fails to perform
the illocutionary act of refusal. Homsby and Langton, "Free Speech and Illocution," p. 31. But it is worth noting that,
on the Gricean view, we can say that the woman in Example 1 does refuse, which seems the right thing to say.
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being prevented from performing certain actions might constitute a rights violation, depending on,
among other things, who is being thus prevented, and from what action; but in most such instances,
the right in question is not the right to free speech.
Re-framing the Silencing Argument in terms of a theory of communication helps make clear
why it is speech - and in particular, women's ability to speak and be understood - that is at issue.
Even if we disagree with Hornsby and Langton about their preferred conception of the right to free
speech, I think that we must agree with them about our reasons for valuing speech: in part, we
value speech because we think it important that minority and disempowered groups be able to get a
hearing. The woman in Example 1 is unable to make her audience hear what she wants to tell him:
that is why she is silenced. Though it is surely also true that women are excluded from certain
social institutions - just as blacks were excluded from voting under apartheid, and homosexuals are
excluded from marrying in the U.S. - that is not part of the explanation of why and how they are
silenced. Their silencing is due to the frustration of their communicative capacities. Relying upon the
Austinian theory of speech acts obscures this point.
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Chapter 2
Who's Responsible for Understanding?
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I shall be concerned with the idea that it is possible for a speaker to be unable to
make herself understood, even when her audience hears every word she utters. I shall say that a
speaker whose utterance goes astray in this manner is thereby silenced: several examples of this
phenomenon will be presented in the following sections. It has been suggested that certain groups
of speakers are particularly liable to be affected by this phenomenon, and that, as a result, they are
systematically disadvantaged: so, for instance, the philosophers Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby
have claimed that women's speech is particularly subject to this difficulty, and moreover, that this
constitutes a systematic harm to women. Further, they have argued, the silencing of women is
attributable, in large part, to pornography: that is to say, they hold pornography responsible for this
silencing.' These are three of the main claims that Langton and Hornsby want to make about this
phenomenon of silencing.
I am interested especially in the third of these claims, that is, the claim that pornography is
responsible for the silencing of women. In order for this claim to be true, it must be the case that it
makes sense to attribute responsibility for at least some instances of silencing to parties other than
the speaker or the audience in a particular speech situation. Critics of Hornsby and Langton have
suggested that this is a crucial difficulty for their argument. I shall defend Hornsby and Langton
against this particular objection: so, I shall argue that it does make sense, under certain
circumstances, to attribute responsibility for an instance of silencing to some party other than the
speaker or the audience in a given speech situation. Though pornography sets the context for this
particular debate, my concern here is with the phenomenon of silencing more broadly: that is to say,
I shall to understand how we can attribute responsibility for silencing to some party other than the
SHornsby and Langton have made these claims in a number of recent papers. To mention but a few: Rae Langton,
"Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993): 293-330; Jennifer Homsby,
"Disempowered Speech," Philosophical Topics 23 (1995): 127-147; Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton, "Free Speech and
Illocution," Legal Theory 4 (1998): 21-37.
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speaker or the audience in the first place, leaving aside the further question about how we might
attribute responsibility to pornography in particular.
I. SILENCING: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
Before proceeding any further, let me present some examples of the phenomenon that constitutes
silencing in my sense. Here's the first example: those of you who are familiar with Jane Austen's
Pride and Prejudice may recall the extraordinary scene in which the novel's protagonist, Elizabeth
Bennet, receives an offer of marriage from her cousin, the tedious Mr. Collins. Miss Bennet wishes
to refuse this offer. The following exchange takes place when she attempts to communicate her
refusal to Mr. Collins:
"You are too hasty, Sir," she cried. "You forget that I have made no answer. Let
me do it without farther loss of time. Accept my thanks for the compliment you are
paying me. I am very sensible of the honour of your proposals, but it is impossible
for me to do otherwise than decline them."
"I am not now to learn," replied Mr. Collins, with a formal wave of the
hand, "that it is usual with young ladies to reject the addresses of the man whom
they secretly mean to accept, when he first applies for their favour; and that
sometimes the refusal is repeated a second or even a third time. I am therefore by
no means discouraged by what you have just said, and shall hope to lead you to the
altar ere long."
"Upon my word, Sir," cried Elizabeth, "your hope is rather an extraordinary
one after my declaration. I do assure you that I am not one of those young ladies (if
such young ladies there are) who are so daring as to risk their happiness on the
chance of being asked a second time. I am perfectly serious in my refusal."
."When I do myself the honour of speaking to you next on this subject I
shall hope to receive a more favourable answer than you have now given me;
though I am far from accusing you of cruelty at present, because I know it to be the
established custom of your sex to reject a man on the first application, and perhaps
you have even now said as much to encourage my suit as would be consistent with
the true delicacy of the female character."2
How should we understand what goes on in this example? One thing we could say is that Mr.
Collins simply doesn't believe that Miss Bennet really doesn't want to marry him. But notice that
2 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice, edited by James Kinsley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980): 79-83.
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this interpretation doesn't sit well with the response Mr. Collins actually gives: after all, in the
passage I quoted, Mr. Collins isn't trying to change Miss Bennet's mind, as he presumably would do if
he believed that she really meant to refuse. Rather, he seems to take her words as the opening
move in some sort of scripted performance, in which her part is to appear reluctant, and his to
continue to press his suit: his reliance on such a script is suggested by his saying that "it is usual with
young ladies to reject the addresses of the man whom they secretly mean to accept, when he first
applies for their favour; and that sometimes the refusal is repeated a second or even a third time."'
He then goes on to refer to this as "an established custom." This suggests, I think, that the best
explanation for what goes wrong in this exchange is not simply that he doesn't believe that she
doesn't want to marry him, but that he doesn't even understand that that is the case.
Accordingly, I propose the following analysis of what happens in the exchange between
Miss Bennet and Mr. Collins: Miss Bennet wants to refuse his proposal. This is to say, among other
things, that she has a particular intention towards Mr. Collins: she intends that he recognize that she
is trying to get him to believe something, namely, that she doesn't want to marry him. Intentions
having this structure are often called communicative intentions;, they play a crucial role in an influential
account of communication, due to H.P. Grice, upon which I shall rely in this chapter.4
According to this account, in order for a speaker and an audience to communicate, it isn't
enough that the speaker should want to inform the audience of something, and the audience come
to be informed somehow or other. Rather, on this view, what distinguishes communication from
other ways of conveying information, such as subliminal suggestion, is that the audience comes to
be informed of the relevant thing in part because he recognizes the speaker's intention to inform
him of that thing. So successful communication requires awareness, on the audience's part, of what
the speaker is attempting to do. The speaker's communicative intention is precisely an intention on
her part to get the audience to recognize what she is trying to do.
3 Emphasis mine.
4 This account is described in Grice's "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions," in his Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989): 86-116.
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So, in attempting to refuse, Miss Bennet has a communicative intention towards Mr.
Collins. Unfortunately, the latter doesn't satisfy that intention: he doesn't come to think that she is
trying to get him to believe that she doesn't want to marry him. Consequently, though he
understands the words that Miss Bennet utters, he doesn't understand her refusal. This is the kind
of failure that counts as silencing in my sense.
To allay the worry that the phenomenon I am describing is confined to novels of the pre-
Victorian era, let me briefly mention some more contemporary examples. First, an example that
has been discussed extensively in the literature on silencing: at the end of a dinner date, a man
makes sexual overtures towards a woman. The woman says "No," intending to refuse. The man
believes that women generally want sex, but also that they tend to be coy in sexual situations, that
they want not to appear too forward. As a result, though he hears her "No," there is no uptake on
his part of her refusal. He goes on to force sex on her.
Next, an example mentioned by Rae Langton: Linda Marchiano, working under the
pseudonym of Linda Lovelace, was the star of Deep Throat, one of the most popular pornographic
films of all time. Some time after the making of the film, Marchiano wrote a book called Ordeal, in
which she described how she was "beaten, tortured, and hypnotized" into performing her starring
role in this film. Marchiano wrote Ordeal to protest the treatment of sex workers in the
pornographic industry. Yet Ordeal regularly appears in so-called "adult reading catalogs." Langton
quotes the following entry from one such catalog:
No. 427 ORDEAL- an autobiography by Linda Lovelace. With M. McGrady. The star
of Deep Throat tells the shocking story of her enslavement in the pornographic
underworld, a nightmarish ordeal of savage violence and unspeakable perversion, of
thrill seeking celebrities and sadistic criminals. For Sale to Adults Over 21 Only.5
Thus, what was written in protest of the pornographic industry is itself sold as pornography.
In both the date rape example and the Ordeal example, the speaker has certain
communicative intentions towards her audience: in the first case, she wants to communicate a
refusal, while in the second, she wants to communicate a protest. In both cases, the speaker's
s Rae Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993): 321.
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communicative efforts fail to accomplish what she wants them to accomplish: in the first case, she
is raped, while in the second, her utterances are themselves used as pornography. One explanation
for what goes wrong in these examples is that the audience just fails to satisfy the speaker's
communicative intention: in the first case, he doesn't come to think that the speaker really wants
him to believe that she doesn't want to have sex with him, while in the second case, he doesn't
come to think that the speaker wants him to feel indignation and anger towards the practices of the
pornographic industry. It is not my intention to suggest that every case of date rape and ever case in
which Ordeal comes to be regarded as pornography should be explained in this way. Rather, my
point is only that this might be the right explanation for some of these cases.'
To summarize: on my view, a speaker is silenced if the following conditions hold. Even
though,
(i) The speaker makes her communicative intention "plain" in the sense of
literally saying what she means in a normal tone of voice;
and,
(ii) Her intended audience hears and pays attention to the words she utters;
nevertheless,
(iii) They (the audience) fail to satisfy the speaker's communicative intention.
Henceforth, I shall assume that silencing in this sense does sometimes happen, that speakers are
occasionally unable to make themselves understood, even though their audiences attend to what
they say. What I want to do now is to recall the claims, mentioned in the Introduction to this
chapter, that women are particularly liable to be silenced, that they are as a result systematically
disadvantaged, and further, that pornography should be held responsible for this silencing. In the
remainder of this chapter, I shall focus on an important objection to these claims; I shall show that
6 Of course, whether this is the correct explanation in any particular case is, in the end, an empirical matter. The most
that I can do here is to make clear what this explanation is. Further examples of silencing will be mentioned later in
this chapter: I think that the examples, taken together, strongly suggest that the phenomenon is some ways rather
quotidian.
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this objection, though ultimately unsuccessful, does help illuminate what is needed to establish
these claims. To that objection, I now turn.
II. THE MAIN CHALLENGE
Here's one kind of story we can tell in support of the claim that pornography should be held
responsible for women's silencing.7 Pornography, it may be argued, produces in its consumers
beliefs that prevent them from recognizing that women sometimes want to refuse sexual overtures,
or that they do not all enjoy sexual degradation and violence. For instance, the belief that women
tend to be coy, that they don't say what they mean, especially in sexual contexts, may be supposed
to contribute to the silencing of the speaker in the date rape example; this is a belief that is often
produced and certainly supported by pornography. Precisely because it is the source and support
for such beliefs, pornography may be held responsible for women's silencing. Or so this story goes.
Against this, it has been objected that even if this story could be shown to be true, it doesn't
actually settle the question about responsibility. According to this story, certain audiences, who
happen to be consumers of pornography, fail to recognize women's intentions to perform certain
speech acts. But why shouldn't we say that such failures happen because these audiences are, in
some important sense, incompetent? That is, why shouldn't we say that pornography affects these
audiences in the ways described by this story exactly because these audiences were warped to begin
with? Many consumers of pornography offer a defense along these lines. They say something like
the following: "I read porn, and I don't have any trouble understanding women. So the problem
must not be with the porn, but with some of its readers." And if it turns out that pornography only
contributes to already-incompetent audiences being unable to understand women, then surely the
responsibility for those failures shouldn't rest with pornography.8
7 This is not the story that Langton tells: for that story, see Chapter 3. It is, however, Hornsby's story, or a close kin.
SThis objection is suggested by Daniel Jacobson, among others. See his "Freedom of Speech Acts? A Response to
Langton," Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1995): 78.
45
According to this objection, then, in order to show that pornography is responsible for
women's silencing, we must show not only that it renders audiences unable to recognize women's
communicative intentions, but further, that it renders even competent audiences unable to do so.
Only then can we conclude that the responsibility for this silencing can be traced to the
pornographers, or, in fact, to any party other than the audiences themselves.
Let me emphasize that last point. Suppose we think that women are systematically silenced,
but that pornography isn't responsible, or at least, isn't solely responsible, for that silencing. So, for
instance, we might think that depictions of women on television or in popular film are equally
responsible for this silencing. To establish any such claim, we still need to show, not just that these
sources render audiences unable to understand women, but that they render even competent
audiences unable to do so. So, the objection I am considering applies just as much to attempts to
attribute responsibility for women's silencing to sources other than pornography, in fact, to
attempts to attribute that responsibility to anyone but the audiences involved.
What we need, then, is a notion of audience competence that goes beyond mere linguistic
competence.' In the remainder of this chapter, I shall sketch how such an account might go. I
want to make clear here that I shall not be arguing for the conclusion that pornography in particular
interferes with the ability of competent audiences to understand women. Before we can assess the
truth of that claim, we need to have answers to certain prior questions, such as:
(i) What counts as a competent audience?
(ii) What do we need to know about a particular speech situation - that is,
about the parties present as well as about the socio-cultural context in
which that situation arises - in order to make a judgement about what a
competent audience would do in that situation?
These questions will be the focus of the rest of this chapter. The further question, regarding
whether pornography, or for that matter, any other source, produces and supports beliefs that
9 There is another possible response to this objection: instead of arguing that pornography prevents competent audiences
from understanding women, we could argue that it renders audiences incompetent. I shall not pursue this second
option here. However, I do think it worth pointing out that pursuing that option would still require an account of
audience competence; so, much of what I do in this chapter is just as relevant to that second option as to the first.
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prevent competent audiences from understanding women, will not be settled here. However, we
shall see later that an answer to the second question does help us get clearer about what we need to
know about pornography, and other sources of beliefs, in order to settle the further question.
III. RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
I want to approach the question of audience competence by making some general remarks about
how to think about communication. To begin with, I want to think of communication - or, even
more broadly, of conversation - as a practice. As such, it is defined by certain characteristic goals
or ends, and certain rules. We engage in the practice because we find the characteristic ends
valuable in some sense, and because we expect that the rules of the practice will guide our actions
in ways that are generally conducive to achieving those ends.
In order to think about conversation in this way, something needs to be said about what its
characteristic ends might be. Certainly, exchange of information is one such end: it seems
incontestable that one of the principal reasons we engage in conversation, and that we value the
practice, is precisely that it facilitates information exchange. But it seems equally clear that we just
as often engage in conversation for other reasons, including self-expression, political expression, and
to establish rapport with others, to name but a few. For our purposes, the details of this list aren't
important; all we need to keep in mind is that conversation does have a variety of characteristic
ends.
The rules of conversation, like the rules of any other practice, enable participants in the
practice to attain the characteristic ends. I want to distinguish between two different kinds of
rules: the context-independent ones and the context-specific ones. A rule of conversation is context-
independent if it governs conversation in all contexts, and it is context-specfic if it governs
conversation in some contexts but not others. So, for instance, the Gricean conversational maxims
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are supposed to be context-independent rules of conversation.10 By contrast, as we shall see in a
later section, rules of etiquette give rise to highly context-specific rules for interpretation.
One final bit of background: at least some of the rules of any practice will be grounded in
certain underlying assumptions. These may be assumptions about the participants in the practice, or
about the characteristic ends of the practice, or even more generally, simply assumptions about how
things are. These assumptions make it the case that certain rules are more appropriate than other
rules, for the purpose of attaining the characteristic ends of the practice. So again, if we look at
Grice's derivation of his conversational maxims, we will note that he takes conversation to be a
rational, purposive activity. That is, in my sense, an assumption that grounds the maxims themselves.
Note that some of the assumptions that in fact ground the rules of conversation may be false, but
they certainly need not all be.
Let me now offer a quick preview of what's coming up. In the next two sections, I shall
consider in some detail a pair of cases that are examples of silencing in my sense. In each case, part
of the explanation for why the silencing takes place is that the audience there relies on certain
context-specific rules to interpret the speaker. I shall suggest that, to decide the question about
audience-competence, we need to know more about these context-specific rules. In particular, we
need to know whether it is reasonable for the audience to rely on these context-specific rules; this, in
turn, depends on whether the rules themselves have certain characteristics, and not others. In the
next two sections, I shall describe what some of these characteristics might be. Then, I shall return
to the example with which I began this discussion - the example from Pride and Prejudice - and
explain what we need to know about the rules that come into play there to determine whether Mr.
Collins behaved competently.
'o Grice introduces these conversational maxims in "Logic and Conversation," in his Studies in the Way of Words
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989): 22-40.
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IV. RULES OF THE THEATER
The first case I will discuss is one that is mentioned by Donald Davidson. Here is the case: in a
theatrical production, an actress is acting out a scene in which there is supposed to be a fire.
Following the script, she yells, "Fire! I mean it! Look at the smoke!" In the meantime, a real fire
breaks out at the back of the theater. Realizing this, the actress attempts to warn the audience by
shouting "Fire!" The audience doesn't respond."
Clearly, this is a case of silencing in my sense. The speaker tries to get her audience to
recognize that she is trying to tell them something: in particular, she is trying to tell them that a
(real) fire has broken out in the theater. Thus, she has a communicative intention towards her
audience, but the latter fail to satisfy that intention. In fact, the audience fails not only to
recognize what the speaker is trying to tell them, but even that she is trying to convey anything at all.
This is because they take the speaker to be following the script of the play, and as such, to be
speaking in the voice of her character, rather than in her own voice. She is assumed to be acting
out a certain role, rather than to be attempting to express her own thoughts and desires.
I suggested in the previous section that certain context-specific rules contribute to the
silencing of the speaker in this example. What rules might these be? Well, it seems that something
like the following rule must play a role:
When an actress standing on stage says something in the course of a theatrical
performance, do not regard her words as evidence of her intention to communicate
something on her own behalf.
This rule, or something very much like it, interferes with the audience's ability to identify the
actress's warning as such. So the following seems to be true: had this rule not been in effect, the
misunderstanding described in this example would not have taken place.
Suppose we grant this story about what goes wrong in this example. Ultimately, we want
to know whether the audience in this example performs competently. I've already suggested that
1 Donald Davidson, "Communication and Convention," in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1984): 269. I have modified the example slightly. Langton also discusses this example. See Langton, "Speech
Acts and Unspeakable Acts," p. 315.
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the answer to this question depends in part on the nature of the rules in effect in the example, and
on how those rules enter into audiences' attempts to interpret speakers. In the remainder of this
section, I shall identify three characteristics of the rule mentioned above that are relevant to
deciding the question about audience competence. Why, and in what manner, these characteristics
are relevant will, I think, begin to emerge along the way.
A. Role-Based Interference
As mentioned already, the theatrical rule that comes into play in the current example contributes
to the audience's failure to recognize that the speaker is attempting to communicate anything at all.
The first thing to note about the failure here is this: had the speaker attempted to communicate
something other than what she did try to communicate, the results would have been precisely the
same. That is to say, the content of what she utters is not particularly relevant to explaining why the
failure takes place; rather, that is fully explained once we note that the speaker occupies a particular
social role, namely, that of an actress engaged in a theatrical performance. To mark this distinction,
I shall say that, in this example, theatrical rules interfere with the actress's ability to make herself
understood in a largely role-based way.
Theatrical rules are not the only ones that interfere with communication in a role-based
way. Rules to the effect that certain individuals should not be regarded as having the mental
capacities of the average adult human can also have the same consequences. To take a somewhat
silly example, consider the plight of the parrot: no matter what it says, its words will not be taken
as evidence for its having communicative intentions, for parrot behavior is governed by something
like the following rule:
When a parrot utters words, do regard those utterances as mimicry, rather than as
attempts on the parrot's part to communicate its own beliefs and desires.
Presumably, this rule is grounded in an assumption to the effect that parrots do not have mental
capacities of sufficient complexity to form the relevant communicative intentions. The same might
be said about very young children: even if they succeed in uttering words of the relevant language,
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their utterances may be taken as attempts to reproduce the noises they hear, rather than as evidence
of their communicative intentions.
Of course, the rules that apply to young children are importantly different from the ones
that apply to parrots, in that the latter are far more robust than the former: whereas there is almost
nothing that the parrot can do that will be taken as evidence of its having a communicative
intention, the same is not true of the child. Robustness is a feature of certain rules that is very
relevant to the question about audience competence; let me turn to that next.
B. Robustness
Consider a context in which a particular rule is assumed to be in effect by members of some group.
I shall say that that rule is robust for that group in that context if it would take a great deal of effort
and evidence to get the members of that group to recognize that someone in that context intends or
desires to opt out of following that rule. Strictly speaking, robustness is a comparative standard,
rather than an absolute one: a rule may be said to be more robust for one group rather than another,
or one rule may be more robust for the same group than a second, or the same rule may be more
robust for the same group at one time than at another.
To illustrate this notion of robustness, let us compare the beginning and middle of a
theatrical performance. It seems to me plausible that at the beginning of a theatrical performance,
theatrical rules like the one we are considering are less robust than in the middle of one. As the
performance goes on, the audience is pulled more and more into the ideal/fantasy world created by
the theatrical work: as that happens, it may become increasingly difficult for a performer who
wishes to have the theatrical rules suspended with respect to her own utterances to achieve this
aim.2 If this is right, then the actress in our current example may be much more likely to get her
audience to recognize her warning at the beginning of the performance, than towards its end.
12 It may be that at any point in a given performance, certain utterances are jarring enough to successfully convey to the
audience the performer's desire to have the theatrical rules suspended. However, my example succeeds if the range of
utterances that would fail to convey this increases as the performance continues.
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C Scope
A third feature of theatrical rules to which I want to draw attention is their scope. As I shall
understand it, scope is a rather heterogeneous notion. The scope of a rule is determined by several
factors, including all of the following: how long the rule tends to be in effect, and in what range of
contexts; what kind of indicators are available for judging whether the rule is in effect, and how
reliable those indicators are; how much of an agent's behavior is governed by the rule when it is in
effect; and, how widely the rule is accepted in the relevant community. Like robustness, scope is
also a comparative standard: one rule may be in effect for longer periods or apply to more of our
activities than another; one rule may be effective in a larger variety of contexts than another; and so
on. Clearly, the scope of any particular rule can be quite limited along some of these dimensions,
and not so limited along others.
The scope of the theatrical rule relevant to the current example is, I think, relatively
restricted and well-defined, at least along the first two dimensions of scope mentioned above.
First, the rule only applies under rather special circumstances, that is, during theatrical
performances: as such, the duration and location of its application are importantly circumscribed.
Moreover, it seems to me an interesting fact about theatrical performances that, in general, it is not
that hard to figure out when someone intends to be putting on such a performance, for there are
usually fairly reliable indicators that an audience can use to make this decision. These indicators -
which may be explicit, as in the case of an announcement to the effect that the theatrical
performance is about to start, or implicit, as in the case of the lights in the auditorium being
dimmed - help demarcate the interval during which the rule applies. This is not to say that there
are no cases in which it is difficult to figure out whether such a performance is being offered;
nevertheless, it seems to me that the hard cases are relatively rare.
In this respect, theatrical rules seem importantly different from rules that govern sexual
contexts. Rules of the latter kind certainly come into play in overtly sexual situations, that is,
situations which are recognized to be sexual by all the parties involved. But it is much easier, I
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think, for there to be reasonable disagreement about whether a particular context is a sexual one
than about whether it is a theatrical one: there are fewer reliable indicators, so that it is quite
possible for one of the persons involved to not be aware that the other regards the situation as
such.
V. RULES OF ETIQUETTE
Let us move now to a second example of communicative failure brought about by an audience's
reliance on context-specific rules. At a dinner party, the host presses a guest to help herself to more
food. The guest is quite full, and doesn't want any more. So she says, quite sincerely, "Oh, no, I
couldn't eat another bite." The host, however, thinks that the guest is simply being polite, not
wanting to appear too greedy; he supposes that guests always say something similar when offered
more food. As a result, he disregards her protests, and continues to press food on her, until the
guest finally feels that she must give in.
Here again we have a speaker being unable to make her intentions clear to her audience. As
before, she tries to get him to recognize that she wants him to produce a particular belief: in this
case, it is a belief to the effect that she doesn't want any more food. Her host hears her words, but
takes her to be saying the sorts of things that dinner guests usually say on such occasions: that is, he
takes her to be attempting to be a good guest, and as such, to be playing along with the rules that
determine what it is to be a good guest in the relevant community.
To fix ideas, let's say that the rule in question is this:
Do regard guests at dinner parties as attempting to not appear too greedy, in
particular, as trying to moderate their intake of the food and drink offered by the
host.
This rule seems to contribute to the communicative failure here at least in the sense that it makes
the following counterfactual true: had the rule not been in place, this misunderstanding would not
have taken place.
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Once again, let's grant that this account of what goes wrong in this example is correct. As I
did with theater example, I want to identify some characteristics of the current example that will
be relevant to answering the question about audience competence.
D. Content-Based Interference
In discussing the theater example, I noted that the content of the speaker's utterance was not
particularly relevant to explaining why that failure took place: had the speaker - that is, the actress
- tried to communicate something other than the fact that a fire had broken out in the theater, the
audience might well have been just as uncomprehending. Rather, the failure in that example could
be explained by noting that the speaker occupied a particular social role, namely, that of an actress
engaged in a theatrical performance. So, I said that the rule that interfered with the speaker's
ability to communicate in that example did so in a largely role-based way.
The current example is importantly different. The speaker here - the guest at the dinner
party - could convey any number of things perfectly successfully to her host in this context: if, for
instance, she happened to comment on how sunny the day had been, her host would not fail to
understand that she meant that the day had been sunny. The rule that gets in the way in this
example applies only to utterances that can be construed as attempts on the speaker's part to not
appear too greedy: it is precisely because her refusal of the host's offer is seen as such an attempt
that she is unable to communicate it. To put the point somewhat metaphorically, she is denied only
certain moves in the conversational game, whereas the actress was denied all.
To explain the failure in the current example, we need to appeal not only to who the speaker
is - i.e., what social role she occupies - but also to what she is trying to say. That is, the explanation
for this failure has to make reference both to the fact that she is a guest at a dinner party, and to the
fact that she is trying to refuse an offer of food. Thus, the rule of etiquette that interferes with the
speaker's ability to communicate here does so in both a content-based way as well as a role-based way.
We can think about role-based interference and content-based interference as two ends of a
spectrum along which cases of communicative failure may be arranged. At the role-based end are
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the failures that can be explained simply by making reference to the social roles the speaker
occupies at the time of the utterance; at the content-based end are the failures that can be
explained simply by making reference to the content of the speaker's utterance. The failure in the
theater example lay somewhere close to the role-based end, while the failure in the current example
- the dinner party example - lies somewhere in between the two ends.
E. Accessibility
A striking feature of some rules, including rules of etiquette, is what I shall call their accessibility: a
rule is highly accessible for a particular group in a given context if members of that group tend to
apply the rule automatically and reflexively in that context, without conscious reflection on its
appropriateness or usefulness. Some rules may generally be more accessible than others; and some
may be more accessible in certain contexts than in other contexts.
One reason to suppose that rules of etiquette are highly accessible, at least for certain
groups, is this: many communities try to inculcate these rules in their members from a very early
age. This is not to deny that there is much variation across communities both with respect to the
contents of these rules and with respect to the extent to which these rules are emphasized in the
upbringing of children. However, where the teaching of these rules does constitute a significant part
of the early education of children, that may be part of the explanation for their coming to be used
in a less reflective manner than rules that are learned at later stages of development.
This notion of accessibility is related to the concept of robustness that I mentioned earlier:
very roughly, accessibility has to do with how easy it is to begin to apply a rule, whereas robustness
has to do with how easy it is to continue to do so, once the rule has been applied initially. It may be
that, in general, accessibility and robustness go hand in hand, that is, that rules that are highly
accessible are also fairly robust, and conversely.
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F. Arbitrariness
Do we have any good reason to abide by rules of etiquette? If what I said above is correct, that is,
if rules of etiquette are often inculcated in us from a very early age, it may be that we apply them
unreflectively, but that, of course, doesn't settle the question of whether we have good reason to
do so. Here's a suggestion: perhaps having in place rules of etiquette promotes social cohesiveness
by making it possible for members of a community to express certain attitudes towards each other,
including, for instance, such favorable attitudes as respect and gratitude. The very fact of an agent's
abiding by the relevant rules, whatever they may be, can be taken as an indication of his willingness
to cooperate and an expression of respect for others in his community. On this view, then, we do
have reason to abide by the rules of etiquette, insofar as we have reason to promote social
cohesiveness in the manner described above.
If this hypothesis about the primary benefit of rules of etiquette is correct, then in order to
realize that benefit, we need to have in place rules governing a range of social interactions,
including, for instance, dinner parties. But notice that what is needed is some set of rules or other:
the purpose served by these rules could just as well be served by a number of alternative sets of
rules. In this sense, the rules of etiquette are arbitrary. Further, recognizing the arbitrariness of
these rules need not make trouble for anyone's reasons for abiding by them: if an agent's best reason
for abiding by such a rule is that doing so tends to promote social cohesiveness, it won't make any
difference that the rules are arbitrary in this sense. So not only are rules of etiquette arbitrary, but
they are also often perceived as such, and this perception doesn't undermine anyone's reasons for
adhering to them.
By contrast, it seems to me that at least some of the rules that govern sexual contexts are not
thought to be arbitrary by those who abide by them; further, recognizing the arbitrariness of these
rules might very well undermine a person's reasons for abiding by them. This is because these rules
are strongly grounded in certain assumptions about what women, and men, are like: so, for
instance, the rule that women shouldn't be taken to say what they really mean in sexual contexts
may be grounded in the assumption that women are by nature deceitful, especially when it comes to
56
sexual matters. But this means that not just any rule would do: part of the explanation for why this
rule seems appropriate is precisely that it is taken to be grounded in how women are. As a result,
this rule may seem "natural" or "right" in a way that rules of etiquette don't.
This is not to suggest that rules of etiquette are not also grounded in assumptions about
how people are, or that just any set of rules would serve equally well. My point is only that the
grounding relation seems, roughly speaking, tighter for sexual rules than for rules of etiquette, in the
following sense: whereas the underlying assumptions make it the case that a number of alternative
sets of rules of etiquette would serve equally well, the underlying assumptions narrow the
possibilities down much further for sexual rules. As a result, many sexual rules seem much less
arbitrary than rules of etiquette.
VI. WHAT IS REQUIRED OF A COMPETENT AUDIENCE?
Let us return now to the objection we considered towards the beginning of the chapter. According
to that objection, in order to show that pornography is responsible for women's silencing, we must
show not only that it renders audiences unable to recognize women's communicative intentions,
but further, that it renders even competent audiences unable to do so. Suppose we grant this.
Clearly, this is a problem for the Hornsby-Langton project only if we think that there is some
reason to suppose that the audiences that misunderstand women are indeed incompetent. Critics of
Hornsby and Langton have supposed that this objection does constitute an important difficulty for
their argument; so they must think that there is some reason to suppose that the relevant audiences
are incompetent. What might that reason be?
Perhaps the reason is something like this. Recall the passage from Pride and Prejudice with
which I began this chapter: that was the exchange between Miss Bennet and Mr. Collins in which
Miss Bennet attempts to refuse Mr. Collins' offer of marriage. In that exchange, Miss Bennet says
to Mr. Collins, "I am very sensible of the honour of your proposals, but it is impossible for me to do
otherwise than decline them." In so speaking, Miss Bennet means precisely what she says: there is
little she could do to make her meaning more explicit. Nevertheless, Mr. Collins misunderstands
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her; moreover, it may be argued that he does so because he invokes a rule for interpreting women
that is inappropriate in that context. Now, suppose we think that a competent audience is one that
invokes rules only where they are appropriate. Putting all of this together, it seems to follow that
Mr. Collins is incompetent qua audience. And once we have concluded that, it is hard to see why
the responsibility for the silencing should lie anywhere but on his shoulders.
But, contra this argument, it isn't at all clear why we should agree that Mr. Collins relies on a
rule that is inappropriate in this context; in fact, it isn't even clear that we should say he invokes the
rule in question, in the sense that that implies that he had some choice in the matter. At the very
least, more needs to be said about the particular speech context, and about what makes the
application of rules appropriate in a given context, to establish either claim. To see this, suppose
that we fill in the details of the context - in particular, the details of the socio-cultural context - in
which Mr. Collins and Miss Bennet are located in the following way. Suppose that it is a context
that is governed by the following rule:
Do take women to be trying not to appear too forward.
Further, suppose also that in this context, this rule is (i) highly accessible, (ii) extremely robust, and
(iii) perceived to be non-arbitrary. (We might suppose further that this rule is grounded in certain
assumptions about the delicacy and modesty of "the female character.") To say that the rule is
highly accessible is just to say that the audience, Mr. Collins, follows it without any reflection, that
he applies it automatically and reflexively. To say that it is extremely robust is to say that, once it
has been applied, it would take a lot of effort, on Miss Bennet's part, to get Mr. Collins to recognize
that she wishes to opt out of the rule. To say that it is perceived to be non-arbitrary is to say that it
seems, to Mr. Collins, "natural," or "obvious," or "just how things are."
In light of this, consider what it would mean to say that Mr. Collins behaves incompetently
qua audience. That is, of course, a normative judgment: it implies that Mr. Collins should not have
done what he did. In particular, it suggests that Mr. Collins should not have applied the rule in
question, a rule which he is not conscious of having applied, and to which he sees no alternative.
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In such circumstances, to say that Mr. Collins should have behaved differently than he did is to
impose on him a heavy burden indeed.
What I am suggesting here is roughly this: an audience performs competently in a particular
speech context to the extent to which:
(i) They (the audience) abide by the rules that are in effect in that context;
and,
(ii) It is reasonable for that audience to abide by those rules.
Whether it is reasonable for the audience to abide by the rules in effect in a given context depends,
in part, on how difficult it would be for that audience to do otherwise; and how difficult it would
be for that audience to do otherwise depends on whether, and to what extent, those rules display
the characteristics mentioned earlier (in §§IV-V). In the example we have been considering, if the
socio-cultural context is as I have hypothesized - if, that is, the relevant rule is highly accessible,
extremely robust, and perceived to be non-arbitrary - then it would be very difficult for Mr. Collins
to not rely on it in attempting to interpret Miss Bennet. This, I suggest, gives us reason to judge
that Mr. Collins' performance as audience is, in fact, competent.
VII. CONCLUSION
Thus far, I have suggested that an audience who relies on a context-specific rule to interpret a
speaker need not be incompetent qua audience, even if that audience's reliance on that rule is part
of the explanation for why he fails to understand what the speaker is trying to communicate to
him. If, for instance, the rule in question is highly accessible, very robust, has broad scope, and is
perceived to be non-arbitrary, the audience's reliance on the rule casts no doubt at all on his
competence.
Let us recall briefly the date rape example that I mentioned earlier in this chapter: that was
the example in which the woman says "No" to a man's sexual overtures, but he doesn't understand
her refusal. It has been suggested that rapes, especially acquaintance rapes, are the results of highly
scripted interactions: the feminist theorist Sharon Marcus, for instance, writes that "a rapist follows
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a social script.""'3 One way of interpreting this claim, at least as it pertains to the context of the
date rape example, is this: such contexts are governed by rules that are sufficiently accessible and
robust, perhaps also role-based, and apparently non-arbitrary, to make it very difficult for the
participants to depart from whatever is expected of them.
By way of concluding, let me briefly take stock. In this chapter, I have sketched how an account of
audience competence might go. More specifically, I have described some of the factors that need to
be considered in determining what a competent audience would do in a given speech situation.
This account is by no means complete; but what I have said is enough, I think, to help us get a better
grip on several aspects of the phenomenon of silencing with which I am concerned.
First of all, my account of audience competence helps us see how it is possible for a speaker
to be silenced even when her audience performs competently qua audience. I have already discussed
this point in some detail, so I won't belabor it further here. But at the same time, this account also
helps us see that there is an important sense in which speakers who are silenced may be unable to
make themselves understood: that is, it's not just that these speakers are, as a matter of fact,
misunderstood, but more strongly, it may be that they also cannot make themselves understood.
Let us also recall that one of the original motivations for being interested in silencing in the
first place was the thought that this phenomenon might systematically disadvantage women. We
are now in a position to distinguish two different senses in which this claim might be true. First, to
say that silencing systematically disadvantages women might just be to say that women are more
likely to be silenced than members of other groups, and that being silenced always constitutes a
disadvantage. Taken this way, the claim about systematic disadvantage becomes a claim about
frequency. This may very well be true, but it doesn't seem to me by itself very interesting.
There is, however, a different way to understand the claim. To say that silencing
systematically disadvantages women might be to say that the socio-cultural context in which we
'3 Sharon Marcus, "Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention," in Feminists Theorigze
the Political, edited by Judith Butler and Joan Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992): 390.
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live is such that there are in effect a number of context-specific rules that particularly interfere with
women's abilities to make themselves understood. That is, it may be that women are not Oust)
more likely to be silenced, but also that the rules of conversation are such that it is more difficult
for them to overcome this silencing than it is for members of other groups to do so. Taken this way,
the claim about systematic disadvantage becomes a claim about the prevailing social conditions, and
the ways in which those conditions seriously constrain certain speakers. It implies that many
interactions in which women are involved, especially those in sexual contexts, are highly scripted,
in the sense of being very rule-bound. And if this is right, then the phenomenon of silencing is
both, I think, philosophically interesting, and also something about which we should be very
concerned.
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Chapter 3
The Speech Act Model of Pornography
INTRODUCTION
Pornography, according to Catharine MacKinnon, "is the graphic sexually explicit subordination of
women through pictures or words."' In thus describing pornography, MacKinnon makes some
highly controversial claims. It has often been said that pornography depicts women's subordination,
and even causes it. MacKinnon, however, goes further: she suggests, in addition, that pornography
is itself a form of subordination, that it constitutes women's subordination. Moreover, she also
suggests that pornography is efficacious it doesn't just aim at the subordination of women, but
succeeds in achieving that aim.2
MacKinnon's characterization of pornography gives rise to a cluster of questions about the
nature of subordination, and about the connection between representation and subordination.
What is subordination? How must we understand the notion in order to make sense of the claim
that pornography, or, for that matter, any other form of representation, can constitute subordination?
Can just any form of representation subordinate? If so, which forms do, as a matter of fact,
subordinate? Further, what sort of social power or authority must a form of representation have in
order to subordinate? And finally, how do some forms of representation come to have the right
kind of power or authority, whatever that might be?
MacKinnon's work has provoked, to put it mildly, a broad range of reactions among her
readers. Some have accused her of conceptual confusion, on the grounds that it is a category
mistake to regard pornography as the subordination of women, as opposed to the depiction of such
' Catharine MacKinnon, 'Francis Biddle's Sister,' in Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1987): 176. The full definition that MacKinnon offers is this: pornography is "the graphic sexually explicit subordination
of women in pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities;
enjoying pain or humiliation or rape; being tied up, cut up, mutilated, bruised, or physically hurt; in postures of sexual
submission or servility or display; reduced to body parts, penetrated by objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of
degradation, injury, torture; shown as filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised or hurt in a context which makes these
conditions sexual."
2 This last point follows from the fact that subordination is a success term.
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subordination; others have tried to find ways of conceptualizing the connection between
representation and subordination in order to help defend MacKinnon against such charges. In the
latter category, the work of Rae Langton is especially noteworthy: in a series of recent papers,
Langton has argued that speech act theory can provide us with the resources to make sense of
MacKinnon's claim that pornography constitutes the subordination of women.3
I shall dub Langton's use of speech act theory to describe the manner in which pornography
constructs social reality - especially the social reality of women - the speech act model ofpornography.
My main aim, in this chapter, is to show that this model is misguided. The speech act model of
pornography offers us a way of thinking about subordination that provides answers, at least in part,
to several of the questions in the cluster described above. In particular, it explains how
pornography can constitute the subordination of women; and it describes certain conditions that
typically have to obtain in order for it to be the case that pornography does subordinate in a given
social context. Unfortunately, the conditions that the speech act model identifies are not the right
ones: whether those conditions are satisfied is in fact irrelevant - I shall argue - to whether
pornography subordinates in a particular context. But this failure is illuminating, for at least two
reasons. First, since the speech act model picks out the conditions it does because it is committed
to a particular view of subordination, the failure helps us diagnose why that model goes wrong: in
particular, it helps us see that this view of subordination contributes crucially to this failure.
Second, this diagnosis, in turn, points us in the direction of a different view of subordination, and
therefore, a different account of how pornography constructs social reality.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly introduce some pertinent
aspects of speech act theory; then, I sketch Langton's efforts to make sense of MacKinnon's
characterization of pornography, which I quoted at the very beginning of this chapter. The speech
3 Here is a partial listing of Langton's papers on this and closely related topics: Rae Langton, "Speech Acts and
Unspeakable Acts," Philosophy and Public Afairs 22 (1993): 293-330; Jennifer Homrnsby and Rae Langton, "Free Speech
and Illocution," Legal Theory 4 (1998): 21-37; Rae Langton, "Subordination, Silence, and Pornography's Authority," in
Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation, edited by Robert C. Post (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute
for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1998): 261-283; Rae Langton and Caroline West, "Scorekeeping in a
Pornographic Language Game," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999): 303-319.
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act model of pornography will begin to emerge in this discussion; but I attempt to make the
commitments of that model clearer in the following section, Section II, by extracting from the
previous discussion five of what I take to be the central assumptions of that model.
In Section III, I consider an argument, offered by Leslie Green, that purports to prove
MacKinnon wrong.4 Green claims that, even if it makes sense to say that pornography can
constitute subordination, it is not plausible to suppose that it does subordinate in our society. I shall
present this argument in some detail, because I think that it is worth looking at the considerations
that Green cites in support of his position: I argue, contra Green, that these considerations are in
fact irrelevant to the question of whether pornography subordinates. However, as I go on to show
in Section IV, these considerations do become relevant if we accept the speech act model, and the
approach to subordination that underpins it. Thus, the speech act model, and the underpinning
approach to subordination, lead us astray. I conclude the chapter with a very brief sketch of an
alternate approach to subordination, towards which we are directed by the failures of the first
approach.
The argument of this chapter is largely critical: as I've already mentioned, my main aim is to
raise difficulties for the speech act model. Much of my efforts here will be directed towards trying
to understand how that model is supposed to work, and to questioning some of the underlying
commitments of the model. However, nothing I say in this chapter will rule out the possibility that
the speech act model, or a close kin, might, at the end of the day, turn out to be the best approach
to the question of whether pornography subordinates. Still, if there are reasons to worry about the
model, and if, further, there are viable alternate approaches to thinking about subordination, then,
at the very least, an argument is required to establish the superiority of the speech act model. This
chapter may be viewed as an attempt to motivate the need for such an argument.
4 This argument is offered in Green's "Pornographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing," in Censorship and Silencing: Practices
of Cultural Regulation, edited by Robert C. Post (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute for the History of Art and the
Humanities, 1998): 285-311.
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I. THE SUBORDINATING THESIS
As we've already seen, MacKinnon's characterization of pornography entails that the following
must be true:
Pornography subordinates women.
Let us call this the Subordinating Thesis. As stated here, the Subordinating Thesis is ambiguous
between two readings. There is, first, the Causal Version of this thesis, which claims that,
Pornography causes the subordination of women.
And then there is also the Constitutive Version of this thesis, which reads:
Pornography constitutes the subordination of women.
Langton, following MacKinnon, is primarily concerned to defend this second version of the thesis,
the Constitutive Version, against charges of conceptual confusion. It is thus not her main aim to
establish that either version of the Subordinating thesis is true, though she does make some gestures
in this direction. Rather, Langton's chief purpose is to provide a theoretical framework that can
help us understand what the Constitutive Version of this thesis says. She thinks that speech act
theory can help with that project. Let us see how.
Speech act theory is particularly attractive for Langton's purposes because of its foundational
insistence that speech is action, that in speaking words, we not only say things, but also do things.
In his seminal work on this topic, J.L. Austin complained of the tendency among philosophers to
focus on the contents of linguistic utterances, and their effects on audiences, at the expense of the
actions constituted by those utterances. In the terminology introduced by Austin, this was just to
say that philosophers tended to recognize locutionagy acts and perlocutionagy acts, but generally failed
to notice the distinct category of illocutionagy acts.
To illustrate this tripartite distinction, consider the following scenario. I say to you: "I'll bet
you a bottle of wine that the United States will win the next World Cup." IKlowing something
about football, you come to expect a bottle of wine from me in 2006. In producing this utterance,
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I do several things. First, and perhaps most obviously, I express a particular content, determined
(roughly) by the conventional meanings of the words I utter: this is my locutionary act. Second, I
cause you to come to expect a bottle of wine in 2006: this is my perlocutionary act. And finally, I
bet you a bottle of wine: this is my illocutionary act.
Illocutionary acts are ones that speakers perform just in uttering the appropriate words in
the appropriate contexts: as suggested already, the notion of illocution is intended to draw
attention to the action constituted by the utterance itself, whereas the notion of perlocution is
supposed to capture the further (causal) effects of the utterance. Examples of illocutionary acts
abound: telling, warning, urging, promising, christening, marrying, and of course, betting are all
illocutionary acts. In saying "Watch out for the boom," a speaker warns; in saying "I'll meet you at
the Brattle," she makes a promise; and in saying "I do", she marries. Of course, in each case, the
success of the intended illocutionary act depends on certain background conditions being satisfied:
for instance, in the last case, it is necessary that the speaker be in the presence of an appropriate
authority, such as a priest or a registrar. Austin dubbed these background conditions felicity
conditions, because their satisfaction ensures that the relevant illocutionary act is happy; I shall have
more to say about these conditions in the next section.
To the list of illocutionary acts I've already mentioned, Langton adds another: the
illocutionary act of subordination. That is, Langton thinks that one of the things that a speaker can
do by saying the right words in the right context is subordinate. By way of explaining this point,
she asks us to consider an example. Suppose that, in South Africa under apartheid, the law
prohibiting blacks from voting was enacted by legislators saying, "Blacks are not permitted to vote,"
in the appropriate context. In speaking these words, these legislators did several things, performed
several acts. First, they deprived blacks of a right, namely, the right to vote. Moreover, they
ranked blacks as having inferior status, as compared to whites. And finally, they legitimated
discrimination against blacks, for preventing blacks from voting - by, e.g., excluding them from
polling booths - is precisely a form of discrimination. In (unfairly) ranking blacks as inferior, in
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(unjustly) depriving them of rights and powers, and in legitimating discriminatory behavior towards
them, the legislators, according to Langton, subordinated them.5
It is crucial, for Langton's purposes, that the legislators' utterance subordinated
illocutionarily, and not Oust) perlocutionarily, that this utterance constituted an act of subordination,
and didn't (just) cause subordination. But how are we to make sense of this? Langton's idea is that
utterances that subordinate illocutionarily do so by constituting norms that, in turn, help to
construct social reality for the subordinated group: more specifically, these norms determine, first,
the social status of the group; second, what rights and powers members of the group possess; and
third, what counts as appropriate behavior towards members of the group. In the example we have
been considering, the norms had legal backing: that is, they were constituted by enacting a law.
But, as we shall see shortly, legislation isn't the only way of constituting the social norms necessary
for illocutionary subordination.
Pornography, on Langton's view, is a further example of speech that subordinates
illocutionarily. In fact, Langton thinks that the way in which pornography subordinates is largely
analogous to the way in which the legislators' utterance - "Blacks are not permitted to vote" -
subordinated in the previous example. Pornography, she thinks, constitutes norms for sexual
behavior, norms to the effect that women are, by nature, submissive, or that they enjoy rape. These
norms rank women as sexual objects, and so, as inferior to men; they interfere with women's
abilities to refuse sex, and perhaps even deprive them of that ability altogether'; and they legitimate
discriminatory behavior, especially in the form of sexual violence, against women. In constituting
the norms for sexual behavior in this manner, pornography subordinates women.
5 It is important here that the ranking was unfair, and the deprivation of fights and powers unjust. As Langton points
out, not all acts of ranking, legitimating, and depriving of rights and powers are acts of subordination: for instance,
ranking an athlete as the best in her sport need not be an act of subordination. However, all instances of unfairly
ranking, unjustly depriving of rights and powers, and legitimating discriminatory behavior might very well be acts of
subordination.
6 That is to say, pornography silences women. See Chapters 1 and 2 for a discussion of this claim.
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This, then, is Langton's effort to make sense of the Constitutive Version of the
Subordinating Thesis: she thinks that we should read that thesis as claiming that pornography
subordinates illocutionarily, by virtue of constituting norms for sexual behavior that rank women as
inferior, deprive them of rights and powers, and legitimate discriminatory behavior against them.7
These are, of course, highly controversial claims; and more needs to be said about what counts as
evidence in their support. However, the discussion thus far does suffice to provide some sense of
what I earlier dubbed the speech act model ofpornography, that is, the attempt to use speech act theory
to understand how pornography helps construct social reality. Since my major aim in this chapter is
to show that this model is deeply problematic, it will be useful, for my purposes, to distill from the
preceding discussion some of the central assumptions on which the model is founded. Having these
assumptions before us will help us get a better grip on how the model is supposed to work.
II. THE SPEECH ACT MODEL
In this section, I shall distinguish five of what I take to be the main elements of the speech act
model of pornography. Each element is an assumption about pornography, or about the way in
which it constructs social reality, to which this model is committed. None of these assumptions is
incontrovertible: so, each is in need of philosophical defense. If one of these assumptions does
prove to be unworkable, the speech act model of pornography would, at the very least, require
serious revision; however - and this is important - it would not follow that pornography doesn't
subordinate. I shall return to this point later.
First, and most obviously, the speech act model is committed to the view that pornography
is a form of speech. This is a controversial assumption, but not one that I will question in this
chapter. I do want to note, however, that this is an assumption that is shared by those who, with
MacKinnon, wish to argue in favor of some regulation of pornography, and by those who oppose
7 Langton does not claim that this is the only way to make sense of the Constitutive Version of the Subordinating
Thesis. Rather, her claim is simply that this is one way of interpreting that thesis that rescues it from worries about
conceptual confusion.
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any regulation whatsoever. In the latter case, this acceptance can be explained, in part, by the fact
that this assumption is required by what is generally considered the most powerful argument against
the regulation of pornography, namely, the argument from the right to free speech: if pornography
isn't speech, it can't be supposed to be protected by the right to free speech. So, at least, in
assuming that pornography is a form of speech, Langton can't be accused of begging any questions
against her opponents.
Next, and even more importantly, the speech act model tells us that pornography
subordinates illocutionarily. In so saying, this model treats subordination as an act, and more
specifically, as an illocutionary act. But typically, where there is an act, there must be an agent; and
where there is an illocutionary act, there must be a speaker. So, according to this model,
subordination is an act, performed by an individual speaker. As such, it is a wrong done by an
agent, or group of agents: we might say that subordination, understood this way, is "an individual
wrong.""7
But this is not the only way to think about subordination. We might instead think of it as a
wrong constituted by the arrangement of social institutions or practices: as such, it would be "a
social/political wrong," rather than an individual wrong. If we did understand subordination in
this second way, it would seem that we would no longer regard it as a wrong done by an agent, or
even a group of agents. Moreover, it's not clear whether we would still regard it as an act: after all,
it is more than a little odd to speak of social practices acting. I shall have more to say about these
two views of subordination in Section IV of this chapter; for now, it suffices for my purposes to
point out just that the speech act model regards subordination as an act performed by an individual
or group, and further, that this is not the only way to think about subordination.
This last element of the speech act model points us in the direction of the next two. If the
speech act model holds that it is acts that subordinate, then, in the case of pornography, which are
8 Sally Haslanger, "Oppressions: Racial and Other" (DRAFT), p. 3. Haslanger distinguishes between agent oppression
and structural or institutional oppression: she suggests that the former is an "individual wrong," while the latter is a
"social/political wrong." Her distinction provides the basis for the two approaches to subordination that I distinguish
here, though I don't think that the two distinctions line up exactly.
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the subordinating acts? And further, if the speech act model holds that it is speakers who
subordinate, then again, in the case of pornography, who are the subordinating speakers? The third
element of the speech act model is the answer to the former question: though Langton is rarely
explicit about this, the subordinating acts must be the acts of producing and distributing
pornography. This, in turn, dictates the answer to the latter question, which gives us the fourth
element of the speech act model: the subordinating speakers must be those who produce and
distribute pornography.
Why should acts of producing and distributing pornography be the subordinating acts? In
general, illocutionary acts are performed either in producing speech, or in making available already
produced speech. For instance, consider the illocutionary act of directing someone towards some
desired destination. One way to do this is to write down the relevant directions; another way of
performing the same illocutionary act is to provide directions that have been printed from the
internet. The first is an act of producing speech, while the second is an act of distributing speech.
Most illocutionary acts may be performed in either of these ways, and there is no reason to suspect
that the illocutionary act of subordination is an exception to this rule.
This brings us to the fifth, and final, element on this list. As already mentioned, every
illocutionary act has felicity conditions, that is, conditions that must be satisfied in order for a
performance of that act to be happy. Given that subordination is, on this view, an illocutionary act,
it too must have felicity conditions. What might these conditions be?
Langton's discussion of the felicity conditions of subordination focuses on one condition
that she takes to be particularly important. This condition, which I shall dub the condition of authority,
makes the following stipulation: in producing an utterance, a speaker performs the illocutionary act
of subordination onAy ifhe has the appropriate form of authority. That is to say, subordination is
one of what Langton labels "authoritative illocutions," that is, an illocution that can onfy be
successfully performed by speakers who are authoritative in the right way.9 What constitutes the
SLangton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," p. 311. Langton seems to think that some illocutions are
authoritative illocutions in this sense, and others not. It is not at all clear to me that that is true.
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appropriate form of authority will vary from one authoritative illocution to another. In the case of
subordination, legislative authority - that is, the authority to enact legislation - is one of the
appropriate forms: this was illustrated by Langton's paradigmatic example of subordination, in
which legislators in South Africa subordinated blacks by uttering the words "Blacks are not
permitted to vote" in a context in which those words enacted a voting law. If the same words had
been spoken by someone other than a legislator, the utterance would certainly not have enacted a
law, and would probably not have constituted any social norms at all. This is not to suggest, of
course, that enacting legislation is the only way to constitute social norms; however, it is certainly
one way to do so.
If having legislative authority is not the only way to satisfy the condition of authority for
subordination, what are the other ways? That is, what forms of authority enable speakers to
successfully perform speech acts of subordination? Moreover, what, if anything, do these forms
have in common? And finally, and most pertinently, do pornographers possess any of these forms
of authority in our society?10 Langton thinks that this last question is at "the heart of the
controversy" over whether pornography subordinates"; however, she also takes it to be a largely
empirical question, and as such, not one that can be settled "from the philosopher's armchair.""'
Many of Langton's critics have fastened on the issue of pornography's authority as the best
reason to reject the Constitutive Version of the Subordinating Thesis: they have suggested that it is
quite implausible to suppose that pornographers are authoritative in the sense required. In the next
section, I shall consider a critique, due to Leslie Green, that pursues this line of thought. As we
shall see, Green looks at how authoritative illocutions work, and argues that pornography cannot
be authoritative speech in the relevant sense. I shall suggest that Green is partly right: the question
of authority does raise important difficulties for Langton, but not, as Green thinks, because it makes
10 In this chapter, I will use the term pornographer to refer to those who produce and to those who distribute
pornography, but not to those who consume it.
" Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," p. 311.
12 Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," p. 312.
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trouble for the Subordinating Thesis per se. Instead, the question makes trouble for the speech act
model of pornography; whether it also makes trouble for the Constitutive Version of the
Subordinating Thesis depends on whether there is an alternate way to make sense of what that
thesis says; and, as I shall try to show later, we have reason to believe that there is such an
alternative.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE SPEECH ACT MODEL
The topic of authority, and of social power more generally, is one that has merited extensive
attention from social and political philosophers. Perhaps as a result, there is broad theoretical
disagreement about how we should understand these notions. It is, of course, agreed that there is a
variety of different manifestations of social power: these include the power of a sovereign over his
subjects; the power of a teacher over her students; the power of a rapist over his victims; the power
of the legal system over those in its jurisdiction; the power of advertising over its consumers; and so
on.13 However, there is no such agreement on a general theory of social power, that is, a theory
about what these various manifestations of social power have in common; in fact, there isn't even
agreement on whether such a general theory is possible, or desirable. In addition, the question of
the relationship between social power and authority, legitimate and otherwise, provides yet another
point of contention.
In responding to Langton, Green offers an account of authority, that is, an account of what
it is for one agent to have authority over another. It is a non-reductive account, in the sense that it
presupposes a notion of social power, which is at least as difficult to understand as authority itself.
Though I shall discuss this account in some detail, I shall not be interested in whether it succeeds as
an account of authority as such: thus, for instance, I shall not try to discover whether there are
cases of an agent's having authority over another that aren't captured by this account. Instead, I
shall be interested primarily in whether the account can illuminate the way in which speakers must
13 This list is not meant to suggest that all forms of social power can be stated using this power-over locution.
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be authoritative in order to successfully perform authoritative illocutions. As we shall see shortly,
Green thinks it can.
Authority, on Green's view, is a form of "effective social power," one that differs from
other forms in that "it works not through brute force or manipulation, but through the giving and
accepting of reasons.""4 More explicitly, Green's account takes the following form:
An agent X has authority over another agent Y with respect to Z only fX's say-so
gives Y a reason of either of the following kinds:
(a) A reason to act with respect to matters relating to Z;
(b) A reason to endorse what A says with respect to matters relating to Z.
In other words, having authority over another requires being in a position to change what the other
has reason to do, what he has reason to believe, and, even more generally, what attitudes he has
reason to adopt. Of course, an agent may have authority over another with respect to certain
matters, and not with respect to others. For instance, a teacher has authority over her students
with respect to school-related matters, but no further: the scope of the teacher's authority is thus
limited. To accommodate this thought, Green takes authority to be a three-place relation, having
the following general form: an agent X has authority over another agent Y with respect to Z, where
Z specifies the scope of the authority.
How does one agent's utterance ever manage to give another agent a reason to act (or
believe)? More specifically, how does a speaker manage to give her audience such a reason by
performing an authoritative illocution? To see how this happens, let us consider a typical case. A
parent tells her child, "You're not leaving the house until you've cleaned your room." In so saying,
the parent makes public her intention to alter the child's permissions, that is, to alter what the child
is permitted to do. Under certain circumstances, making public such an intention is sufficient to
give the child reasons for action. Specifically, according to Green, the relevant circumstances are
these: first, the parent and child must be situated in a social context in which it is generally
14 Green, "Pomrnographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing," p. 293.
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accepted that parents' utterances set "binding standards of behavior"'" for their children, at least
with respect to domestic matters; and second, the social context must also be such that these
standards are enforced. Arguably, our social context satisfies these conditions: we do generally
accept that parents set binding standards for their children, and further, we allow parents to
enforce these standards, and in many cases, even help them do so. In light of this, our social
context is one in which a parent's making public her intention to change her child's permissions is
sufficient to give that child reasons to act: in the current example, it gives the child a reason to either
clean his room or stay home.
This gives us, in brief outline, Green's account of authority, and his picture of how
authoritative illocutions typically work. We are now in a position to return to the question with
which we ended the previous section: in our society, do pornographers have the authority to
successfully perform the speech act of subordination? Green thinks that there is serious reason to
doubt that they do have this authority. More specifically, he opposes Langton's idea that
pornography constitutes norms that rank women as inferior, deprive them of rights and powers,
and legitimate discriminatory behavior against them: Green doesn't think that pornography has the
authority to constitute norms at all. Thus, he writes:
While it is possible that some people do use pornography for normative guidance
about sex, that is certainly not its standard use. As MacKinnon rightly says,
pornography is mostly "masturbation material." Most consumers want their
pornography to be arousing rather than didactic or even reassuring, and there is
nothing in most pornographic imagery that corresponds to the orders,
recommendations, verdicts, and other types of speech that characterize examples of
speech act theory. It would be hopelessly naive, for instance, to think that each
image bears the message "Look, this how it is to be done; this is right and proper." ''
5 Green, "Pornographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing," p. 294. To set "binding standards of behavior" for a
particular group is, presumably, to constitute norms that govern the behavior of members of that group. As I use the
terms, all standards of behavior are norms, but the converse isn't true: for instance, it may be a norm in a given context
that women are, by nature, submissive; but this is not itself a standard of behavior, though of course, it may be
incompatible with certain standards. Norms mark correct ways of viewing the world, as well as appropriate ways of
behaving: as such, they govern belief (and other attitudes), as well as action.
16 Green, "Pornographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing," p. 296.
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Though this passage is admittedly opaque, we can make sense of Green's reasoning by keeping in
mind the picture of authoritative illocution with which he is working, and which I sketched above.
Let us consider how that picture is relevant here.
The quoted passage seems to contain two main claims. First, Green tells us that consumers
don't turn to pornography for instruction in sexual matters, or for guidance about what constitutes
appropriate behavior in sexual contexts: their interest in pornography is exhausted by its use for
sexual stimulation. From this, Green infers, I think, that the following must be true:
(1) It is not generally accepted among its consumers that pornography constitutes
norms for them with respect to sexual matters.
If pornography is regarded as merely "masturbation material," then it seems to follow that it is not
considered to be a source of norms.
Further, and more curiously, Green also tells us that there is nothing in most pornography
that directs consumers to use it for guidance regarding sexual matters. Thus, pornographic texts and
images aren't accompanied by messages claiming that they represent how women really are, or what
constitutes correct behavior in sexual contexts. The absence of such messages is significant, to
Green, because it speaks to the question of what pornographers give their consumers reason to do,
or to believe. More specifically, the absence of such messages leads Green to draw the following
conclusion:
(2) Pornographers don't give their customers reason to believe that they intend to
constitute norms for them.
In this, pornography differs from "the orders, recommendations, verdicts, and other types of speech
that characterize examples of speech act theory," in which the speakers do make public their
intentions to perform the act in question.
Putting this together: as we saw earlier, Green has in mind a particular picture of how
authoritative illocutions constitute norms for a particular group. On his view, an authoritative
illocution constitutes norms by giving members of the group in question reasons for action or belief;
and it does, typically, by making public the speaker's intention to perform the act in question, in a
context in which it is generally accepted that her utterances constitute norms, and in which those
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norms are enforced. If (1) and (2) are correct, then at least two of these conditions aren't satisfied
in the case of pornography: it is not generally accepted that pornographic utterances constitute
norms; and pornographers don't make public their intentions to do so. Then, given the picture of
authoritative illocutions in the background, it seems to follow that pornographers' utterances don't
give their consumers reasons for action or belief in the manner that authoritative illocutions
typically do. Therefore, these utterances don't constitute norms for the consumers; consequently,
pornographers don't have the authority to subordinate.
This, then, is Green's reply to Langton and the Constitutive Version of the Subordinating
Thesis. The reply raises certain worries: I shall mention three in the following sections, in increasing
order of importance.
A. Pornography vs. Other Forms of Representation
To begin: it appears that Green's argument can be modified to show, regarding nearly any form of
representation, that it doesn't subordinate: besides pornography, this also includes advertising,
television shows, and films. Take, for instance, the case of advertising: it is often suggested that
images in advertising constitute norms for body image, especially for women. These include, for
instance, norms to the effect that thin women are happier, or that overweight women are lazy.'7
Moreover, it has also been suggested that these images affect even those who "know better" than to
be affected in this manner.'8" Arguably, if advertising does constitute norms for body image in this
way, it subordinates at least certain groups of women, for instance, women who are chronically
overweight: these norms (unfairly) rank such women as inferior, and legitimate discriminatory
behavior against them.
17 Compare with Langton's claim that pornography constitutes norms to the effect that women enjoy rape, or that they
are, by nature, submissive.
18 Note that I am not suggesting that images in advertising affect all consumers in this way, but only that the
consumers who are affected in this way may not want to be so affected, that is, that these consumers may not accept
advertising as a source of norms.
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But if Green is right, then advertising doesn't subordinate, for the same reasons that
pornography doesn't subordinate. To see this, consider the analogues for (1) and (2) in the case of
advertising:
(1 ')It is not generally accepted among its consumers that advertising constitutes
norms for them with respect to matters of body image.
(2')Advertisers don't give their customers reason to believe that they intend to
constitute norms for them.
(1'), which is the analogue to (1), follows from what I said above, that is, that advertising
constitutes norms even for some who don't wish to be so affected. And (2') is true for the same
reasons, mutatis mutandis, that (2) is true. Then, in light of Green's picture of how authoritative
illocutions constitute norms, it follows that advertisers don't constitute norms for their consumers,
and therefore, that they don't subordinate women. A similar argument can be constructed for
many other forms of representation.
The broad reach of Green's argument is important for the following reason. As I have
already mentioned, some of those who object to MacKinnon's views on pornography are
nevertheless willing to accept that other forms of representation do subordinate; some complain
that these other forms do at least as much harm to women as pornography, and consequently, that
feminists make a mistake in focussing on pornography to the extent that they do. If we agree with
such views - and there is, I think, much to be said in their favor - then we must either reject
Green's argument, or show why it cannot be modified to apply to the forms of representation that
we do think subordinate. The latter, I suspect, is not an easy task.
B. Pornographers' Intentions
Green's discussion of authoritative illocutions brings to light a crucial aspect of illocutionary acts:
typically, these acts work via the publication and recognition of the speaker's intentions. In
general, recognition of a speaker's intention to perform a particular illocutionary act isn't, by itself,
sufficient to ensure the success of the act, but it is necessary. There are, however, some hard cases,
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that is, cases in which it is not clear whether an illocutionary act has been successfully performed.
Among these are cases in which the speaker doesn't intend to perform an illocutionary act, but her
audience takes her to be performing one; also, cases in which the speaker does intend to perform an
illocutionary act, but her audience fails to recognize that she is attempting to do so; and even cases
in which the speaker intends to perform one illocutionary act, but her audience takes her to be
attempting to perform a different one. In some of these cases, the question about whether an
illocutionary act is successfully performed may be decided by looking at what the speaker could
reasonably have been supposed to be attempting to do, and what the audience could reasonably have
been expected to recognize; but even considerations of this sort won't always settle the issue.
However, it is worth noting that, when we turn to pornography and the illocutionary act of
subordination, we don't seem to have a case that is difficult in any of the ways enumerated in the
previous paragraph. Instead, this is a case in which, arguably, the speakers don't intend to perform
the illocutionary act in question; at the very least, if Green is right, it is a case in which the speakers
don't give their audiences much reason to suppose that they have any such intention.'" Further, it is
also plausible that the audiences don't take the speakers to be attempting to perform that act. If
this is right, then it seems that there really is no question about whether pornographers successfully
perform the illocutionary act of subordination in producing and distributing pornography: rather, it
appears that the answer is unequivocally negative.
But there is more to be said here. As we saw above, the speech act model, recommended by
Langton, and not challenged conceptually by Green, seems to commit us to asking certain questions
about pornography, particularly questions about pornographers' intentions in producing and
distributing pornography. But let us compare this to how we think about subordination in other
cases. Imagine a "Whites Only" sign placed over an entrance to a restaurant, a "N.I.N.A." 20 sign
placed in a shop window, or a Confederate flag placed in the window of a private residence. Let us
'" Plausibly, this follows from the truth of (2).
20 No Irish Need Apply.
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assume, for the moment, that the first two signs aren't actually enforced in those particular
establishments. Even then, it seems that these images may subordinate, at least in certain social
contexts.2' But does it seem right to suppose that whether they subordinate depends on what was
intended by the person(s) who placed - or produced, or distributed - the signs? Suppose that the
owner of the restaurant, the shop, or the residence testifies that his intention in putting up the sign
is simply to preserve a part of American history, and to remind others of that part; suppose, further,
that he is entirely sincere in this, if somewhat naive. Would the benignancy of his intention suffice
to establish that the sign he puts up doesn't subordinate in that particular context? The answer, it
seems to me, is again clearly negative.
My point here is not that all, or even most, of those who put up signs of the types
mentioned in the previous paragraph do not intend to subordinate, or even that they don't give
others reasons to believe that they intend this; rather, my point is that their intentions seem entirely
irrelevant to whether these images do in fact subordinate. And if that's right, then we should also
notice that the speech act model tells us to approach the question of whether pornography
subordinates rather differently from the way in which we are inclined to approach the question of
whether these signs subordinate, and it isn't clear how that difference can be justified.
C. Pornographers' Social Role
I have been arguing, contra Green, that pornographers' intentions don't matter to whether
pornography subordinates. That is one way in which Green's argument misses the mark, assuming,
of course, that the mark is the Subordinating Thesis, and not simply Langton; but it is not the only
way. As we've seen, Green argues that pornographers don't, as a matter of fact, have the authority
to constitute norms - and therefore, to subordinate - in our society. He doesn't undertake to show
21 There is, of course, a question about whether these signs cause subordination or constitute it. I think it's plausible that
signs can constitute norms, and thereby subordinate: for instance, it has been argued that flags, in certain contexts,
legitimate violence in the name of patriotism. As we shall see, the question then becomes: is there some way to give an
account of how an image can constitute a norm that doesn't rely on speech act theory and, in particular, the concept of
illocution?
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that pornography couldn't subordinate in any social context: thus, for instance, he doesn't suggest
that Langton fails to save the Constitutive Version of the Subordinating Thesis from charges of
conceptual confusion. Rather, it seems that Green would agree with Langton that there are
"imaginable circumstances where material just like pornography in other respects would have no
authority, and in such circumstances such speech would not subordinate"22 ; the disagreement
between the two, with respect to the question of whether pornography subordinates, seems to
focus largely on what our circumstances are like.
Thus, we see that Green and Langton both think that whether pornography subordinates is
a context-dependent matter: more specifically, it is a matter that is decided by the particularities of
the social context. But how, precisely, is social context relevant here? That is, how do some social
contexts constitute pornography as authoritative, while others don't? An answer to these questions
is suggested by Green's discussion of authoritative illocutions.
Green argued that pornography's lack of authority can be explained, in part, by the fact that
it is not generally accepted by its consumers as constituting norms for them with respect to sexual
matters2 3; instead, pornography is merely considered to be "masturbation material." Further,
according to Green, this lack of acceptance of pornography as a source of norms can, in turn, be
explained by the general perception of pornography as "low-status speech" in our society. 24 Green
doesn't explain what he means by this phrase, but the interpretation that immediately suggests itself
is this: to say that a kind of speech is "low-status" in the relevant sense is to make a claim about the
relative social status of the speakers. In this case, of course, the speakers are the pornographers.
Thus, Green seems to think that it is relevant here that pornography, as an institution, has
significantly lower social status than, for instance, "the state, the family, and the church."25 As a
22 Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," p. 313.
23 This "fact" is just thesis (1).
24 Green, "Pornographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing," p. 297.
25 Green, "Pomographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing," p. 296.
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result, he suggests, the speech of those who occupy offices in the latter institutions can set binding
standards of behavior in a way that the speech of pornographers cannot.
Significantly, much of what Green says here is fits extremely well with Langton's views on
subordination. Recall Langton's paradigmatic example of illocutionary subordination: the utterance
of "Blacks are not permitted to vote" by legislators in South Africa in a context in which it enacts a
voting law. The speakers in this example occupy offices within one of the high-status institutions
Green mentions. And it is particularly clear in this example that the speakers subordinate in virtue
of their social positions, for they subordinate by enacting a law, and they manage to enact this law
in virtue of the offices they occupy.
Thus, once again, it seems that the speech act model commits us to asking certain questions:
in this case, these are questions about the social position, including the relative social status, of the
speakers.26 But again, it is unclear how relevant these questions are in the current context, for it
seems possible that certain forms of representation and certain images may subordinate in spite of
the (relatively low) social position of their producers and distributors. Consider again the three
images we discussed previously: the "Whites Only" sign over a restaurant entrance, the "N.I.N.A."
sign in the shop window, and the Confederate flag in the window of a private residence. Do we
need to know about the relative positions of the individuals who contributed to the presence of
these images in these locations in order to determine whether they subordinate? It seems to me that
we can know that they do subordinate even if we know nothing about these individuals, but do
know about the existence and functioning of racist social practices and institutions in the relevant
social context, and about how these images contribute to that functioning. I shall return to this
point in the next section.
To summarize: there can be no doubt that whether pornography subordinates is a context-
dependent matter. The speech act model of pornography commits us to one way of understanding
26 Social position is dependent on, but not determined by, economic power. Pornographers have economic power, but
arguably, they lack social position, at least as compared to those who occupy positions in the other institutions Green
mentions.
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this context-dependence: it tells us that pornography subordinates, where it does, in virtue of the
social positions of the pornographers. But that isn't the only way of spelling out this context-
dependence. It seems right that forms of speech sometimes subordinate by virtue of the social
position of their producers and distributors; but there are other ways in which a social context
might constitute a particular form of speech as authoritative. Green succeeds in ruling out one way
in which our social context might have constituted pornography as authoritative; but, since he isn't
interested in challenging the speech act model itself, he doesn't even consider the other ways.
IV. TOWARDS A DIFFERENT APPROACH: SOME QUESTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
I have now presented several worries about Green's argument. But where, we might ask, does this
leave us with respect to the main concern of this chapter, namely, the speech act model of
pornography? To answer this question, it will help to briefly recapitulate our discussion thus far.
As we've seen, Langton offers the speech act model as a way of making sense of the Constitutive
Version of the Subordinating Thesis, which claims that,
Pornography constitutes the subordination of women.
Very briefly, this model regards pornography as speech, and the production and distribution of
pornography as speech acts, in particular, as instances of the (illocutionary) speech act of
subordination. Accordingly, acts of producing and distributing pornography are, on this view,
taken to be authoritative illocutions.
Green accepts this attempt to make sense of the Subordinating Thesis, but argues that the
thesis is in fact false in the social context in which we live.27 In constructing this argument, Green
expands upon the speech act model by describing an account of authority, and a picture of
authoritative illocutions, to which he takes this model to be committed. Further, he suggests that
once these commitments are appreciated, it becomes clear that pornography is not, min our society,
27 Green, it seems, would think that this would be the case in any "liberal" society that supports "principles of free
expression," and in which pornography is "low-status speech" in the manner discussed earlier. See his
"Pornographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing," pp. 296-7.
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an authoritative illocution in the sense required by Langton. The crucial sticking points, for Green,
are these: first, whereas illocutions typically work by the publication and recognition of the
speaker's intentions, pornographers don't give their consumers any reason to suppose that they
intend to subordinate; and second, whereas authoritative illocutions usually subordinate, where
they do, in virtue of the social positions of the speakers, pornographers arguably occupy a relatively
low social position within our society.
Against this, it seems to me plausible that images can subordinate even if their producers
and distributors don't intend them to, and even if the social positions of those producers and
distributors, and perhaps even their very identities, are not generally known. If this is right, then
the pornographers' intentions and social positions are in fact red herrings with respect to the
question of whether pornography subordinates; and insofar as the speech act model commits us to
asking about said intentions and social positions, it commits us to asking the wrong questions.
Let me offer a diagnosis of why the speech act model goes wrong in this manner: as I
suggested earlier, that model regards subordination as an "individual wrong," that is, as a wrong
done by one agent, or group of agents. Where such wrongs are concerned, intentions are crucial: to
establish that such a wrong has been done, it is not enough to show that one agent harms another
agent (or group). Additionally, it needs be shown that the first agent intended the harm, or at the
very least, that the harm is a foreseeable consequence of something that the first agent did intend:
typically, the intention helps individuate the act, and therefore, the wrong. Conversely, if no such
intention can be established, we may still be able to show that there is harm, but not that there is
an individual wrong.
It is also crucial, with respect to individual wrongs, that the agent who commits the wrong
have the necessary power or authority: it is in virtue of having this power that the agent is able to
perform the wrong. In many cases of individual wrong, the relevant kind of power will be the
agent's social power, derived from his social position or role: Langton's paradigmatic case of
subordination, concerning South African legislators enacting apartheid law, is an individual wrong
of this type. But there are also cases of individual wrong in which other kinds of power, such as
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the agent's physical power, are also at issue: murder may be an example of an individual wrong of
this latter type. However, all individual wrongs have this in common: in order to establish that
such a wrong has been done, we need to pay attention to the kind of power had by the agent who is
supposed to have committed the wrong. Therefore, one way of arguing that an agent hasn't in fact
performed a particular individual wrong is to show that he doesn't have the relevant kind of
power.
In theorizing any wrong, including subordination, as an illocutionary act, we understand it
as an individual wrong: if the wrong is constituted by the illocutionary act, it is a wrong done by
one agent, the speaker, against others. Institutions cannot perform illocutionary acts; nor can social
practices. As we've seen, the speech act model of pornography treats subordination as an
illocutionary act: accordingly, it makes sense that that model requires us to consider pornographers'
intentions and social positions in order to establish whether pornography in fact subordinates. I've
argued that these are not the relevant considerations; if that's right, then, in light of what I've said
in this section, it seems to follow that we should reject the speech act model, and the approach to
subordination it exemplifies. But then we are left with the question: what other approach is there?
We might begin the attempt to imagine a different approach to subordination by recalling
the type of wrong that Haslanger contrasted to individual wrongs, namely, social/political wrongs.
A wrong of this second type is constituted by the arrangement or organization of social or cultural
institutions, practices, policies, and other structures, rather than by the actions of particular
individuals. A social/political wrong, as I understand it, may be done regardless of the intentions of
the individuals involved with the relevant structure: this is because any such structure can construct
social reality in various ways that are not intended by any individual, or even group of individuals,
within the structure. Further, such a wrong might be done even if none of the individuals involved
with the structure has high social position, that is, is recognized as socially powerful. Plausibly, the
constitution of a particular social/political wrong will depend crucially on what kind of wrong it is,
and which types of structures are involved: given the central concerns of this chapter, I shall
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therefore concentrate on what it would be to regard subordination as a wrong of this type, where
pornography is the relevant structure.
What we want, then, is a way of thinking about subordination that, first, makes sense of
the Constitutive Version of the Subordinating Thesis, and second, views subordination as a
social/political wrong. As a first step, we might take up again Langton's idea that pornography
subordinates by constituting norms, and ask: is there any way to make sense of the view that
pornography constitutes norms without regarding that constitution as an illocutionary act? I shall
conclude this chapter by describing, very briefly, a line of thought that seems to promise an
affirmative answer to this question.
A remarkable aspect of Langton's discussion of pornography is its consistent lack of
attention to the contents of pornographic texts and images, that is, to what these texts and images
convey, and to how they convey what they do2 8: at least at first glance, it is surprising to find an
account of how pornography constructs social reality that largely ignores such issues. However, this
lack of attention begins to make sense once we recall that, for Langton, the question of whether
pornography subordinates in a given context turns on whether pornography has authority in that
context, and the latter question, as we've seen, turns on the authority of pornographers in that
context, rather than on anything to do with the contents conveyed by pornography. Thus, Langton
writes, "If pornography subordinates women, then it is not in virtue of its content, but of its
authority that it does so."2 9
But perhaps Langton is wrong to dissociate the questions of pornography's authority and its
contents to the extent she does. Might we suppose, instead, that whether pornography has
authority, or social power, in a given context does depend on what it conveys in that context, and
even on how it conveys what it does? That is to say, is it plausible to suppose that certain kinds of
28 The exception to this is the paper co-authored by Langton with Caroline West, "Scorekeepinmg in a Pornographic
Language Game." But even this piece can hardly be considered a sustained effort at content analysis.
29 Langton, "Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts," p. 313.
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speech - or, more generally, certain forms of representation - might subordinate just in virtue of
what they convey in a given context?
There are, I think, two related ways in which the (social and cultural) context can help
constitute particular texts and images as authoritative: first, the context can help determine what
those texts and images mean - what they convey - to particular individuals; and second, the
context can also help determine what those individuals learn from the texts and images. The first
point is, in a sense, obvious: it is, after all, quite uncontroversial that the meanings of texts and
images depend on the context. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing how extensive this context-
dependence is. Consider again the Confederate flag that was placed in the window of the private
residence. What this image conveys, to a particular individual, depends on a variety of factors,
including all of the following: the symbolism of flags; his associations with the Civil War; his
experiences of racial oppression; his sense of the connection between past and present; and so on.
And, though this requires argument, it seems entirely reasonable for different individuals to
understand such images in these widely varying ways.
That the social and cultural context also determines what individuals learn from texts and
images is perhaps less obvious. But I think that this point can be illustrated by considering another
example involving the use of a flag, namely, the proliferation of the American Stars and Stripes in
the immediate aftermath of the events of September 11th. In a context in which the flag has
militaristic and jingoistic overtones, members of many minority groups, and others, found this
proliferation very threatening, precisely because they felt that it legitimated violence against
individuals perceived to be Arabic or Muslim. Arguably, the fear was that the widespread
deployment of such flags gave the green light, so to speak, to those who wished to exact vengeance
for the terrorist attacks, that these individuals would - quite reasonably, though of course this
requires argument - take the pervasiveness of these flags as giving them the go-ahead to vent their
anger.30 Though the American flag had presumably some of the same meanings before September
30 Katha Pollitt makes some of the points in this paragraph. See her "Put Out No Flags," The Nation, October 8,
2001. Notice also that I am not claiming that these flags caused individuals who would otherwise be nonviolent to
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11th as well, the concern that it would legitimate violence in this way became far more acute in the
period following that day. That is to say, I think, that the post-September 1 th context constituted
the American flag as authoritative in a way that it hadn't been previously.
Unlike the examples we have been considering in the previous two paragraphs, pornography
consists not of a single image, but of sequences of images, and texts as well. But the kinds of
context-dependence outlined in the previous paragraphs apply just as much to pornography, as well
as to other forms of fiction and fantasy. In fiction, as in the images discussed above, what the texts
and images mean, and what readers learn from them, depend crucially on the social and cultural
context; and as with the previous cases, the context can sometimes succeed in giving them the
authority to constitute norms. If that's right, then in order to figure out whether pornography
subordinates by constituting norms for its consumers, we need to answer the following questions.
How does the social and cultural context help constitute what particular works of pornography
mean to an individual, or to members of some group? What aspects of an individual's social and
cultural identity are relevant to determining what such a work mean to him, and how are these
aspects relevant? How does an individual learn from a given piece of pornography? And, finally,
under what conditions is it reasonable for an individual to learn what he does from such a piece?
The answers to these questions would, I think, go a long way towards explaining how certain
contexts may constitute certain contents as authoritative, and therefore, as subordinating.
V. CONCLUSION
Sometimes, Langton writes, "saying so can make it so"": for instance, sometimes saying that
someone is inferior is enough to make him count as inferior, that is, to rank him as inferior. The
speech act model of pornography gives us one way of spelling out this thought: saying so can make
it so, according to that model, when the words are spoken by the right speaker. I have tried to
become aggressors, but rather that the proliferation of these flags directed their perhaps already latent aggression towards
members of certain races and ethnicities.
31 Langton, "Subordination, Silence, and Pornography's Authority," p. 267.
87
suggest a different interpretation of this slogan: saying so can also make it so when the words are
spoken in the right way in the right context, regardless of who speaks them. Of course, the speaker
is part of the context; but it seems to me that, when addressing the question of whether
pornography subordinates, we need to focus our attention on other aspects of the context as well,
to see how they might figure certain words and certain images as powerful, as authoritative,
regardless of the intentions or the social power of the person(s) uttering them. If that's right, then
what we need is an account of how the meanings of texts and images are constituted by the
contexts in which they are made available, and of how consumers learn from said texts and images.
Such an account would help us understand subordination as a social/political wrong, for it would
allow us to see it as a wrong that is constituted, in a deep sense, by the social and cultural context.
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